

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 060 564

EA 004 153

AUTHOR Noone, Donald J.
TITLE Teachers Vs. School Board.
INSTITUTION Rutgers, The State Univ., New Brunswick, N.J. Inst. of Management and Labor Relations.
PUB DATE Feb 70
NOTE 129p.
AVAILABLE FROM Research Section, Institute of Management and Labor Relations, University Extension Div., Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903 (\$3.50)

EDRS PRICE MF-\$0.65 HC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS Board of Education Policy; *Boards of Education; Collective Negotiation; *Conflict; *Conflict Resolution; *Decision Making; Power Structure; *Teacher Administrator Relationship; Teacher Associations; Teacher Militancy

ABSTRACT

This report describes the historical process through which a public employer and the public employees in a school system ultimately reached a satisfactory level of mutual accommodation. Over a 20-year period, the gradual shift in the relative power of the parties produced a relationship from which at least some elements of conflict had been removed. Three time periods are discussed. At first, the behavior of the school board toward teachers was characterized by exclusion of the teachers from the decisionmaking process. Subsequently, the power differential declined, the teachers began to mobilize their collective power effectively, and forced the board to make concessions to which it would never before have consented. Finally, in the power differential elimination period, the union, first by a strike and then by association, and by issuing sanctions, demonstrated its willingness to disrupt the school system to achieve a share in the board's education decisionmaking. The implications of this research for boards of education and teachers are presented. (Author/JF)

ED 060564

TEACHERS VS. SCHOOL BOARD

by
DONALD J. NOONE

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
OFFICE OF EDUCATION
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRO-
DUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM
THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIG-
INATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPIN-
IONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY
REPRESENT OFFICIAL OFFICE OF EDU-
CATION POSITION OR POLICY.

RESEARCH SECTION
INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT AND LABOR RELATIONS
UNIVERSITY EXTENSION DIVISION
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY • THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY
NEW BRUNSWICK, NEW JERSEY
FEBRUARY, 1970

EA 004 153

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS COPY-
RIGHTED MATERIAL BY MICROFICHE ONLY
HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Rutgers Univ.

State Univ. of N. Jersey

TO ERIC AND ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING
UNDER AGREEMENTS WITH THE U.S. OFFICE
OF EDUCATION. FURTHER REPRODUCTION
OUTSIDE THE ERIC SYSTEM REQUIRES PER-
MISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNER."

Price: \$3.50 per copy

Copyright 1970 by
Rutgers University
The State University of New Jersey

PRINTED IN THE U.S.A.
MACCRELLISH & QUIGLEY COMPANY



PREFACE

In this study Dr. Noone describes the historical process through which a public employer and public employees in a school system ultimately reached a satisfactory level of mutual accommodation. Over a twenty-year period marked by frequently acrimonious and frustrating interchanges, the gradual shift in relative power of the parties produced a relationship in which at least some elements of conflict have been removed.

The purpose of the author was to identify, for groups in conflict, behavioral patterns characteristic of successive stages in the process of a shift in relative power. But, even if not intended, the study provides support for those who advocate legislation as a means of formally settling recognition disputes in the public sector; disputes that involve determination of appropriate units and designation of employee representatives. It invites the conclusion that had such legal machinery been available at an earlier stage, the foundation for a satisfactory relationship could have been established long ago. In fact, the final paragraph of the monograph almost makes the point explicitly. Under the impetus of a state law which came into effect after data collection had ended and which granted public employees the right to organize and provided for exclusive recognition, one of the competing employee organizations won an election and was designated as the exclusive representative of the teachers. The author states: "Since that time the union's relationships with

the board have been characterized by great harmony and mutual respect."

Whether the work stoppage which occurred in the third phase of the teacher-school board relationships could similarly have been prevented is more difficult to judge. While labor relations laws, agency intervention, and legal strike prohibitions have not eliminated strikes in the public sector, it is reasonable to assume that the availability of formal machinery for mediation and fact-finding permits settlement in some cases which would, in its absence, end in work stoppages.

Dr. Noone's study is instructive in tracing the natural evolution of group conflict in circumstances in which there is a tenacious search by the weaker party for equality of power. Where conditions in other public agencies can be identified as similar in character, legislators and the public can utilize this study to assess the merits and the implications of alternative public policies governing relations between public employers and public employees.

JACK CHERNICK, *Chairman*
Research Section
Institute of Management and
Labor Relations
University Extension Division
Rutgers University

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Sociological research is rarely a one-man operation. Typically, financial support has to be found, cooperation of the research population obtained, and the critical opinion of professionals on the research report sought. This project was not any different. A large number of people contributed in significant ways towards its execution and completion. Particular thanks go to Dr. Jack Chernick, Director of the Rutgers Institute of Management and Labor Relations' Research Section. He was instrumental in providing financial support to the author for well over a year, an enormous help in obtaining entree to the principal parties in Stonehedge, and from the inception of this research project to its completion his continuing advice has been most generous.

To all of the officials of the union and the association on the state and local level, to whom we pledged anonymity, as well as to the Superintendent of Schools in Stonehedge, the Secretary of the Board of Education, members of the Board of Education, and to a large number of teacher informants, the sincere thanks of the author are given for their generous cooperation in the data-gathering phase of the project.

The author is especially indebted to Dr. Bernard Goldstein, who supplied continuing critical insight and unflagging support throughout the project. To other colleagues, Dr. Earl Rubington, Dr. David Popenoe, and Dr. James Begin, great gratitude is extended

not only for their reading and rereading of the author's work but for their many helpful suggestions for revision. While this book has benefited from their criticism, its deficiencies are, of course, attributable to the author alone.

This book would not have seen the light of day in its present form had it not been for the interest and support of Dean Ernest McMahon and Dean Harry Stark of Rutgers University Extension Division. To them and to J. Carl Cook and Mrs. Hope Fead, editors in the Extension Division who handled the production of this book, a warm gratitude is felt.

A word of thanks must also go to Mrs. Marjorie Watson, Mrs. Estelle Blostein, and Mrs. Louise Aerstin, secretaries at the Institute of Management and Labor Relations, who deciphered the author's original handwritten manuscript and put it into readable form.

Lastly, the author wishes to thank his wife who encouraged him throughout the project.

DONALD J. NOONE
February 1, 1970
Cornell University Medical College

CONTENTS

I.	PROBLEM AND PROCEDURES	1
II.	CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND OVERVIEW	10
III.	TIME 1 THE TRADITIONAL POWER DIFFERENTIAL: BOARD BEHAVIOR	18
	<i>Equality—Teachers and Janitors; Ignoring the Teachers; Request Denied; Clerical Limbo; Prom- ises and No Payoff; Placation by Resolution; Committees and Cooling the Mark Out; Diver- sionary Involvement; Cooptation; Protest and Preventive Timing; Shuffling the Salary Guide; Budgets, Deadlines, and the Plea for Time; Ritual Testimony.</i>	
IV.	TIME 1 THE TRADITIONAL POWER DIFFERENTIAL: TEACHER BEHAVIOR ..	29
	<i>The Individual Entrepreneur and Inferiority; The Deference of the Depressed; Defeat and Accep- tance; Rally 'Round the Budget; Forms of Pro- test; Coups and Pseudo-coups; The Reactive Pos- ture; Sex and Suppression.</i>	
V.	TIME 1 THE TRADITIONAL POWER DIFFERENTIAL: ASSOCIATION-UNION RELATIONSHIPS	40
	<i>Unity; Schism; The One-upmanship Game; Inter- organization Antipathy; Coalitions.</i>	
VI.	TIME 2 THE POWER DIFFERENTIAL DECLINE: TEACHER BEHAVIOR	45
	<i>The United Movement; The Checkoff and Sta- bility; Preparations, Persistence, and Payoff; Ac- tion Programs and Influence; Modes of Communi- cation and Content; Surveys and Organizational Support; Mottoes and Militancy; Pressure, Perse-</i>	

verance, and Success; Some Failures and Their Consequences; The Budget Slash and the Offensive Attitude.

VII. TIME 2 THE POWER DIFFERENTIAL
DECLINE: BOARD BEHAVIOR 58

Ritual Testimony Revisited; Diversionary Involvement; Ignoring the Teachers; Keeping Relations Unstructured; Promises, Procrastination, and Partial Concession; Chronicle of a Resolution; A Crowded Agenda; Attack on the Check-off; The Case of Extracurricular Pay.

VIII TIME 2 THE POWER DIFFERENTIAL
DECLINE: ASSOCIATION-UNION
RELATIONSHIPS 66

Coalition 1961; Interorganization Antipathy; The One-upmanship Game; The Collective Bargaining Election Episode; Coalition 1966.

IX. TIME 3 THE POWER DIFFERENTIAL
ELIMINATION: UNION BEHAVIOR 75

Preparation, Project MESS, and Organizational Support; From Request to Demand: The Posture of the Strong; Persistence and Publicity; Resolve, the Hard Line, and a Threat; A Demonstration of Power; The Disruption of the School System and the Possibility of Abandoning It; The Wedge of Power and the Bilateral Agreement; The Aftermath.

X. TIME 3 THE POWER DIFFERENTIAL
ELIMINATION: ASSOCIATION
BEHAVIOR 85

Petition for Reopening Negotiations and Patience; Using an Intermediary; Arousing the Membership: The Rational and Circuitous Route; The Union and One-downmanship; Progress and the Hard Line; Eclipse, Stolen Thunder, and the Dramatic Gesture; Third Parties, Fleeing the System, and Propaganda; "Hammering Out a Settlement": The Militant Vocabulary; The Aftermath.

XI.	TIME 3 THE POWER DIFFERENTIAL ELIMINATION: BOARD BEHAVIOR	94
	<i>Silence as a Position of Strength; Delaying Tactics, With the Budget in the Wings; Inflexibility and the Motion of Negotiation; The Bad Judgment of the Strong; A Strike and the Legal Remedy; Legal and Other Kinds of Definitions of the Situation; Use of the Press and Swaying Public Opinion; Playing One Teacher Group Against the Other; Use of Experts; The Aftermath.</i>	
XII	TIME 3 THE POWER DIFFERENTIAL ELIMINATION: ASSOCIATION-UNION RELATIONSHIPS	102
	<i>One-upmanship; Broadening the Power Base; Invitation to a Zero Sum Game: A Collective Bargaining Election; Biding Time as a Negative Response; Support and the Crisis-to-be; Anti-Federation Themes: Strike Period; Power Play and the Sweetheart Episode; Mediation and the Proliferation of Teacher Organizations; Anti-Union, Anti-Association Themes: A New Level of Acrimony.</i>	
XIII.	SUMMARY AND PROSPECTS: SOME IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH	110
APPENDIX		
A.	SOURCES OF DATA	117
B.	METHOD OF HANDLING AND ANALYSIS OF DATA	119

Chapter I

PROBLEM AND PROCEDURES

Every society has agencies in addition to the family, that help to socialize and educate the young. The public school system is one of the main vehicles in the United States designed to achieve this goal. It is a system that has its roots in a twofold assumption: that the task of equipping the young to play important roles in society is too complex for the family to handle, and that this task is, nevertheless, something the family ought to do. Consequently, schools have been set up to educate the young *in loco parentis*.

This attachment to the idea of the school as a parental substitute has been recognized in most state constitutions and has encouraged local control of the schools. This means that the members of the highest decision-making body in a community's school system are either elected directly by the local voters or appointed to that position by elected officials. In either event, they are expected to be sensitive to what the parents want in the way of education for their children.

These decision makers are generally called the school board and their chief task is to set education policy, prepare the school budget, and insure the proper running of the schools. Below the school board are the professional staff—the administrators and the teachers. The administrators are the professional managers of the system, and of this group some are principals or assistant principals of particular schools while others are attached to the superintendent's staff. The superintendent is the highest professional educator

in a system as well as the school board's chief executive officer. On the lowest professional level of authority is the teacher who is the day-to-day instructor of the student. The student, of course, is at the bottom of the school's pyramidal structure and is the primary beneficiary of the professional staff's efforts. In the background, generally, but not always, are the parents. Sometimes overlapping the parent role, and sometimes not, is the community taxpayer who bears the financial burden of paying for the schools. In addition to the different vested interests and diverse kinds of relationships these local groups have among themselves are their affiliations with regional, state, and national associations—organizations whose activities often have profound consequences for education in a community.¹

It is clear that given the multiplicity of a school system's various roles, as well as the differing kinds of individual and group behavior that exist in a school system, it is needless to say that the system is characterized by an exceedingly complex variety of relationships. Since space does not allow all these to be considered with any degree of thoroughness, the general question studied here will deal only with the changing nature of teacher-school board relationships. In particular, the investigation will focus on the rise of teacher militancy.

The Teacher Militancy Phenomenon

A *New York Times* report dated January 22, 1967, stated that during the six-year period that ended June, 1966, there were 36 strikes by teachers. Of the 36 strikes, almost one-half, or 17, occurred during 1965-1966. In the 1966-1967 period the latest evidence shows that 33 strikes were called,² while in the 1967-1968 school year over 98 strikes occurred.³ For the 1968-1969 school year 131 strikes and work stoppages were reported by the National Education Association in *Teachers Strikes and Work Stoppages*, dated December 27, 1969.

These strikes manifest the rise of teacher militancy, but are only a gross measure of it. They are like the visible part of an iceberg in that there are a host of other types of teacher protest that never

eventuate in a strike, but differ perhaps only in degree from one, e.g., picketing without a work stoppage, refusing to handle extra-curricular activities, obviously concerting sick days, taking professional holidays, reporting to the classroom late, petitioning, threatening, resigning en masse, rejecting school board decisions, stacking school board meetings, blacklisting a school district, withholding contracts, etc. These variations of protest are occurring in all parts of the country.

In New Jersey alone, for example, from January 1 to January 31, 1967, there were over two dozen instances in which teachers engaged in militant protest against Boards of Education. In Woodbridge, the American Federation of Teachers local, an affiliate of the AFL-CIO, went out on strike, while the Woodbridge Education Association, a local of the National Education Association, issued sanctions and threatened mass resignation; in Camden, the N.E.A. local of teachers struck; in Linden and Piscataway, a significant proportion of the teaching staff took a sick day; in Phillipsburg, Madison, and Matawan, the teachers picketed; and in Watchung Hills, the teachers attempted a sleep-in.

In other states these patterns have been replicated over and over again. For example in Kansas City, Missouri, the teachers threatened a walkout. In Idaho the state association threatened sanctions, while in Oklahoma 27,000 teachers threatened to strike unless the state improved its financial aid to education. In March 1968 the Pennsylvania State Education Association mobilized its membership for a mass march on the capitol in order to pressure the legislature into more favorable legislation.

Although between 1940 and 1959 15 major work stoppages involving teachers occurred throughout the United States, teacher militancy since then has been unprecedented.⁴ In many school systems comfortable tradition is being challenged as a restructuring of the power relations between teachers and school boards is occurring; teacher militancy as it is expressed in overt actions is one sign that in their school systems the power of the teachers vis-à-vis school boards has increased. Although this rising tide of teacher militancy is not yet of wave proportions, it may be soon. Benjamin Epstein, a knowledgeable member of the National Association of Secondary School Principals, has written:

A struggle of major history-making proportions may take shape in the next decade of American public education around the power of teachers' organizations to become equal partners of school boards in the control of public schools . . .⁵

As of the moment, however, some teacher groups are still weak vis-à-vis their school boards, many are increasing their strength, and some have already demonstrated that they are their school board's equal.

Some Research Questions

If Epstein's prediction is accurate, it is of some importance to gain an historically rooted understanding of this phenomenon. If the future of teacher-school board relationships is going to be characterized by a relative equality in power of teachers and school boards, the first question of interest is: what kinds of behavior will teachers and school boards manifest toward one another given this relative equality in power? Since this equality does not just happen overnight, it is relevant to inquire into the kinds of behavior that could be expected from both teachers and school boards during the period when teachers are increasing their power. If the details were known of the kinds of behavior that teachers and school boards engage in when the power of the teachers is minimal, it would also contribute considerably to the understanding of today's teacher militancy.

These questions about the behavior of teachers and school boards in a changing power relationship can really be reduced to one question: what patterns of behavior do teacher groups and school boards manifest toward one another as the level of teacher power increases? Providing answers to this question is the focus of the empirical research presented in this study.

Some related research has been done in this general area of teacher militancy by Lieberman,⁶ Moskow,⁷ Stinnett,⁸ Wildman,⁹ Cole¹⁰ and others, but as yet no one has attempted to take a systematic longitudinal view of the changing power relations of teachers vis-à-vis a school board and catalogued the diversity of behavior each party engages in. Other more theoretically oriented researchers like Gross,¹¹ Hunter,¹² Goldhammer,¹³ Mills and Davis,¹⁴ and

Ralph Kimbrough,¹⁵ who have dealt with the power structure of the school system have elaborated static rather than dynamic developmental views of power relationships.*

Research Case

Four important facts that have implications for the kinds of behavior teachers and school boards engage in should be noted:

1. The principal parties involved in the power relation change noted above are the teachers, who are public employees, and the members of the board of education, who are the elected or appointed agents of the state and community.
2. Most teachers belong to an N.E.A. or A.F.T. local and these groups are in a membership competition.
3. This power relation change is something that has not occurred overnight, but has, on the contrary, been unfolding in time.
4. This power relation change is a dynamic process that occurs, not in isolation, but in a community composed of a variety of groups and individuals other than the principal parties interested in and involved in the power relation change itself.

These facts provide a clue to the complexity of the research problem and suggest some of the variables involved, e.g., the time element, the changing levels of power, the interaction of principal parties with differing ideologies and tactics, and third parties in and outside the community who influence the power relations of the principal parties.

The complexity of the empirical situation also, of course, has implications for the kind of research case that might be used as well as the kinds of data that could be collected. Given the emphasis put on the developing nature of teacher power through time, it would, first of all, be necessary to utilize historical data that documented the kinds of behavior teachers and school boards manifested toward one another as the levels of teacher power increased. Sec-

* For a more detailed analysis of relevant literature see the author's unpublished doctoral dissertation, *A Theory and Case Study of a Power Relation Change* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University, 1969).

only, to describe the diversity of the patterns of behavior of both teachers and school boards, as well as their relative importance, would necessitate a great deal of information from a variety of sources to afford anything approaching adequate documentation.* This moved the present research out of the survey arena. It was decided, consequently, to select for intensive investigation one reasonably typical school system that exemplified a radical rise in teacher power over the years from a point of clearly inferior power to that of the school board to a point of relatively equal power. Despite the disadvantages of limiting the study to one case and to only the principal parties involved in a power relation change process, the advantages of doing such a study seemed numerous:

1. It has not been done before, yet it is a first logical step in developing a sensitivity for the relevant variables at stake.
2. It affords the possibility of organizing a broad range of different types of qualitative and quantitative data.
3. It enables the researcher to investigate many of the important individual, organizational, and contextual variables with some ease.
4. It facilitates the analysis of the power relation change as it develops through time.
5. It presents the opportunity to describe an important social process in rich detail.
6. It provides a high probability of obtaining insight into the whole power relation change process and, most importantly, of suggesting promising hypotheses for further study.

Such a power relation change has been developing for a long time in Stonehedge (not its real name), a city with a population of almost 100,000, located in the Middle-Atlantic, urban-industrial corridor. Stonehedge had a school population in 1967 of over 20,000 pupils. The number of teachers at that time was nearly 900. Stonehedge is an industrial city with ceramics, brick manufacture, and oil refining as its principal industries. Most of the workers in these industries reside in Stonehedge. Another large segment of the working population commutes to the nearby metropolitan area to white-collar jobs. The male work force is, however, more blue

* See Appendices A and B for Sources of Data and Method of Handling the Data.

collar than white collar, but the town has a distinctly middle-class tone about it. There are no ghettos; single-family homes predominate; the streets are clean; the Negro population does not exceed 4 percent and the city is a potpourri of ethnic diversity having significant numbers of "old American stock" as well as large segments of Irish, Italian, Polish, and Hungarian extraction. The social and cultural life of the community is "lowbrow" and there is a vast proliferation of social, fraternal, political, civic, and religious organizations that occupy the leisure time of the townspeople. In many ways its population is typical of urban-industrial America; it is a melding and aspiring working class on the move. An interesting index of its typicality was its selection in the Sixties by the National Municipal League for the "All American City Award."

When it comes to the educational sphere, this city is an ideal model to investigate, for it crystallizes many of the key aspects of the power struggle that has been and will be developing in many community school systems across the United States. The case involves:

1. A long history of teacher acquiescence and adherence to the unilateral decisions of the school board.
2. The organization of individualized teacher power into collective organizations.
3. Long-lived competition for the allegiance of teachers between two teacher groups—the union and the education association.
4. A school board-teacher conflict—with the school board in the position of having to cope with two dissatisfied teacher groups.
5. A long strike by the teachers' union and the imposition of sanctions by the teachers' education association.
6. An aroused community taking various sides.
7. A resolution of the conflict.
8. Programs of action for the future formulated by the principal parties.

Analogous situations have occurred in Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Perth Amboy, Camden, Newark, Jersey City, San Francisco, Dearborn, Detroit, Stratford, Hartford, Madison, Milwaukee, Rochester, New Rochelle, New York City, Cleveland, Youngstown, Cincin-

nati, and to a greater or lesser degree in over 400 other cities across the country.¹⁶ In this sense, then, Stonehedge is an archetype of a power relation change occurring in many community school systems.

Objectives and Significance

It was thought that the Stonehedge case would document a wide gamut of behaviors manifested by the teachers and the school boards as their levels of power changed through time and that findings from this school system might shed some light on the past, present, and future behavior of teachers and school boards in other school systems across the country.

From a practical viewpoint it also appeared that the findings could be instructive to teachers, school boards, and school administrators. All of these groups agree that quality education for students can only be achieved in an atmosphere of reasonable peace and harmony and that disruptive conflicts between teachers and school boards do not contribute to this end. It is possible, if educators studied the experience of one school system, as has been done in Stonehedge, and saw the blind alleys and abortive behavior as well as the fruitful tactics and strategy pursued by the principal parties in a power relationship as these unfold in time, they could anticipate and resolve many a conflict in their own system before it became serious. Although this research is not designed to develop an action program that would facilitate this end, the possibility of learning by analogy exists.

REFERENCES

¹ David A. Goslin, *The School in Contemporary Society* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1965), Chaps. I and II.

² Martin Essex, "Teacher Militancy," *Address at the American Association of School Administrators Convention*, February, 1968.

³ "Why Teachers Strike," *U. S. News and World Report*, LXIV (February 19, 1968), pp. 84-85.

⁴ Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Work Stoppages Involving Teachers, 1940-1962," *Summary Release* (November, 1963).

⁵ Benjamin Epstein, "What Status and Voice for Principals in Collective Bargaining and 'Professional Negotiation' by Teacher Organizations," *The Bulletin of the National Association of Secondary School Principals*, XLVIX, No. 299 (March, 1965), p. 234.

⁶ Myron Lieberman and Michael H. Moskow, *Collective Negotiations for Teachers* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966); Myron Lieberman "Battle for New York City's Teachers," *Phi Delta Kappan*, XLIII (October, 1961), pp. 2-8; "Teachers on the March," *Nation* (February 1, 1965), pp. 107-110; "Who Speaks for Teachers?," *Saturday Review* (June 19, 1965), pp. 64-66, 74-75; "Teacher Strikes: An Analysis of the Issues," *Harvard Educational Review*, XXVI (Winter, 1956), pp. 39-70; "Influences of Teachers' Organizations upon American Education," in *Social Forces Influencing American Education*, ed. by Nelson B. Henry (Chicago: National Society for the Study of Education, 1961), pp. 182-202.

⁷ Michael Moskow, *Teachers and Unions: The Applicability of Collective Bargaining to Public Education* (Philadelphia: Industrial Research Unit, University of Pennsylvania, 1966); "Collective Bargaining for Public School Teachers," *Labor Law Journal*, XV, No. 12 (December, 1964), pp. 787-794; "Recent Legislation Affecting Collective Negotiations for Teachers," *Phi Delta Kappan*, XLVII, No. 3 (November, 1965), pp. 136-141; "Teacher Organizations: An Analysis of the Issues," *Teachers College Record*, LXVI (February, 1965), pp. 453-463.

⁸ T. N. Stinnett et al., *Professional Negotiations in Public Education* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966).

⁹ Wesley A. Wildman, "Collective Action by Public School Teachers," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, XVIII, No. 1 (October, 1964), pp. 3-19; "Implications of Teacher Bargaining for School Administration," *Phi Delta Kappan*, XLVI, No. 4 (December, 1964), pp. 152-158; "Legal Aspects of Teacher Collective Action," *Theory into Practice*, IV (April, 1965), pp. 55-60; Wesley A. Wildman and Charles R. Perry, "Group Conflict and School Organization," *Phi Delta Kappan*, XLVII, No. 5 (January, 1966), pp. 244-251.

¹⁰ Stephen Cole, *The Unionization of Teachers, A Case Study of the UFT* (New York, Frederick Praeger, 1969).

¹¹ Neal Gross, *Who Runs Our Schools?* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958).

¹² Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).

¹³ Keith Goldhammer, "Community Power Structure and School Board Membership," *American School Board Journal*, CXXX (March, 1955), pp. 23-25.

¹⁴ Warner E. Mills, Jr., and Harry R. Davis, *Small City Government: Seven Cases in Decision Making* (New York: Random House, 1962).

¹⁵ Ralph B. Kimbrough, "Development of a Concept of Social Power," in *The Politics of Education*, ed. by Robert S. Cahill and Stephen P. Heneley (Danville, Ill.: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1964), pp. 93-94.

¹⁶ These instances have been reported in issues of *Phi Delta Kappan* since 1960, *passim*; and *American Teacher Magazine* (Chicago: American Federation of Teachers, since 1962, *passim*).

Chapter II

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND OVERVIEW

Definitions of Terms

Power is a capacity, a potency, an attitude, possessed by an individual, small group, or an organization.¹ If possessed to a high degree, it refers to the ability to make one's wishes prevail despite, independent from, or contrary to what another wishes. A power relation refers to a situation where at least two parties are interacting over some issue, and each party is trying to make its wishes prevail. A relatively simple dynamic analysis of this situation would involve at least three important elements: (1) at least two parties, each possessing a certain level of power; (2) an interaction; and (3) an outcome—which answers the question of whose wishes prevailed.

When the concept of power relation change is introduced into the power relation defined above, a transition has occurred. The transition referred to is in the levels of power possessed by the parties opposed to one another. Since all change is a transition of something from one pole to another pole, to obtain any adequate understanding, any change must be examined in at least two points in time: the point at which the change began and the point at which it terminated. For further understanding, attention should be given to the period between the beginning of the change and its completion.

The type of power relation change under discussion refers to the increase in the level of power possessed by a party that has traditionally been subordinate to another party. It is a transition from low power to relative equality in power with the "other" with whom it interacts. The time periods that can be logically specified and defined in terms of the relative levels of power of the interacting parties are therefore: Time 1—the traditional power differential situation, Time 2—the power differential decline, and Time 3—the power differential elimination.²

A Qualitative Measure of Power Levels

To utilize the framework above it was necessary to be able to measure power. A number of possible measures were considered, but the one chosen was a qualitative one; namely, the mode in which an issue was dispatched between the principal parties. In other words, how were the decisions in a school system made? The two polar modes decided upon were unilateral and bilateral. Unilateral decision making occurred in the situation where school boards had superior power and the teachers inferior power. Where this situation prevailed it was regarded as Time 1, the traditional power differential situation. Bilateral decision making occurred in the situation where teachers and school boards had relatively equal power. Where this situation prevailed, it was regarded as Time 3, the power differential elimination situation. Time 2, the power differential decline, occurred, of course, between Time 1 and Time 3, and it was characterized by an increasing share in the educational decision making on the part of the teachers, with the school board, however, still clearly in the ascendancy. It was characterized by a mix of the old unilateral decision making, but presaged the beginnings of bilateralism.

Stonehedge was chosen for investigation because the situation there approached the actualization of these measures. The empirical questions of interest were: at what points in time did these periods occur in Stonehedge, and what was the array of behavior that the teachers and the school board manifested toward one another throughout these different periods?³

An examination of the data revealed that Time 3, the power differential elimination period, as measured by the existence of the bilateral mode of decision making, did not occur until early 1967 when the teacher groups actually demonstrated that they could seriously disrupt the educational process in the school system and force the board to sign a memorandum of agreement.⁴

Time 2, the power differential decline period, began in late 1961 with the first vigorous, collective display of militancy, which militancy ushered in the era of open paternalism. This period was characterized by an increasing teacher activity in opposition to the board and by a board response that was a combination of behavior that indicated a fixation with the unilateral mode of decision making yet an increasing though reluctant openness to teacher inroads into it.

Time 1, the traditional power differential period, as measured by the domination of the school board's unilateral mode of decision making, existed for all the years prior to Time 2, the power differential decline period. Time 1 was characterized by a low level of teacher activity in opposition to the board resulting in a meager influence on the board's decisions. (Some reasonable cutoff point had to be determined for Time 1 beyond which no data would be collected. August 1943 was the point decided. This made the data collection period of Time 1 amount to 18 years.)

Although each of these periods is categorically differentiated by the mode of decision making found; nevertheless, in the concrete there are instances where on certain issues the board adopted a bilateral decision-making mode in Time 1, and likewise in Time 3, exercised its unilateral decision-making power. The particular emphasis here is that the style of decision making is the overwhelmingly predominant orientation of that Time period.

Overview of Data Collected

The basic unit of analysis is the interactional behavior event. An interactional behavior event refers to an overt action engaged in at one point in time by one of the principal parties in the changing power relationship and directed at another party. (See Appendices.)

In Time 1, the traditional power differential situation, the behavior of the school board with regard to the teachers was characterized by a veritable exclusion of the teachers from the decision-making process. Furthermore, the board buttressed its autonomy by engaging in a variety of delay tactics that appeared calculated to dilute whatever influence the teachers tried to have on it. The teachers, on the other hand did not protest, but were passive, deferential, and generally grateful to the board for whatever improvements the board saw fit to give them. It is important to note that during this Time 1 period, in 1945 to be exact, the nominal unity of the teacher group was split when 11 teachers bolted from the teachers' association and started a teachers' union. This act initiated a long-standing controversy between the two groups that generally prevented them from consistently presenting a united front to the board. As a consequence, even though they enrolled all the teachers in the ranks between them, they never in this period materially intruded on the board's unilateral decision making.

In Time 2, the power differential decline, the teachers began to mobilize effectively their collective power and by exerting it forced the board to concede things it would never have consented to in Time 1. This was particularly true in both the beginning of Time 2, late 1961, and the end of this period, early 1966—times when the union and the association joined their forces to confront the board on the question of budget cuts. In both instances they met with some success.

At other times during this period, each teacher organization, separately and in many instances quite effectively, made its influence felt by the board. During these times both the union and the association tried to "one up" the other as well as denigrate their opponent's achievements. The school board, on the other hand, was the target of the union and the association when they were acting separately as well as when they coalesced to pressure the board. In response, the board's behavior was generally characterized by attempts at stalling in its Time 1 manner, but also by a reluctant openness to teacher influence.

In Time 3, the power differential elimination period, the union first, by a strike, then the association, by issuing sanctions, demonstrated their willingness to disrupt the school system to achieve their

goal of obtaining a share in the board's education decision making. This goal was achieved by each teacher group and was signaled by the signing of their respective memoranda of agreement by the school board. On the other hand, at the outset of this period, the board's behavior was essentially a Time 2 holding action. The board was committed to the legal definition of its autonomy and fought all attempts to diminish it. Nevertheless, when faced with the reality of its school system being severely disrupted by a strike and sanctions, it invited the teachers to share in the decision making by sitting down with them for genuine bilateral negotiation.

While this was going on between each teacher organization and the board, the rivalry, antagonism, and level of recrimination between the union and the association was at its bitterest. When the spring of 1967 ended, there appeared to be little prospect of any inter-organizational teacher harmony in the immediate future.

The Logic of Presentation

Of the ten subsequent empirical chapters, three chapters deal with the behavior of the teachers and the school board as found in the Time 1, traditional power differential situation. Three chapters deal with these behaviors in Time 2, the power differential decline period, and four chapters deal with Time 3, the power differential elimination period. The following discussion explains the logic behind the chapter presentation for each time period.

Time 1, The Traditional Power Differential Situation. Of the three chapters devoted to Time 1, the first chapter presents the board behavior, the second the teacher behavior, and the third deals with the association-union relationships. The behavior of the board is presented first because during this period the board was clearly in the ascendancy, habitually exercised its unilateral decision-making power and, in general, was the dominant party in the teacher-school board relationships. The teacher behavior, on the other hand, is presented in the chapter after the board behavior for they exhibited, in general, a kind of behavior we have described as "the reactive posture." In Time 1 the board behavior is, therefore, put first in order to understand those things to which the teachers were reacting. It is important to note that in this second Time 1 chapter

where teacher behavior is discussed that a separate chapter is not allocated to union behavior or to association behavior vis-à-vis the school board since the behaviors they exhibited were not substantially different from one another and since as far as the board's behavior went, it did not appear to make any difference that there were two teacher organizations in Stonehedge. In addition, these organizations did not seem to make much difference to the aggregate of teachers either, for many, individually and in a few instances collectively, bypassed these organizations in their own dealings with the board. Since the teacher effort at influencing the board was minimal, even when the organizations acted on the teachers' behalf, and since the power of the teachers was still effectively individualized and inferior, the behavior of the teachers vis-à-vis the board is treated in one chapter.

The third Time 1 chapter deals with the origin of the union and the subsequent association-union relationships. Although the existence of these teacher organizations in this period in no way altered the unilateral decision-making practices of the school board, in Time 2 and Time 3 they did contribute to the eventual alteration of the power relationships between them and the board. In order to understand that development, it was thought to be relevant to examine their relationships with one another as well as with the board from their beginnings in Time 1.

Time 2, The Power Differential Decline. Of the three chapters devoted to this Time 2 period, the first chapter deals with the teacher behavior, the second with the board behavior and the third with the association-union relationships. In this period teacher behavior is presented first because it is the teachers who break out of the "reactive posture" mode of Time 1 and begin to exert initiative and vigor in their dealings with the board. The board, on the other hand, is the "reactor." The incidents to which the board reacted can be best understood by presenting the teacher behavior first. The third Time 2 chapter presents the developing association-union relationships.

Time 3, The Power Differential Elimination. Whereas in Time 2 the association and the union dealt with the board in substantially the same manner, in Time 3 their ideological differences were translated into significant behavioral differences. Consequently, a sepa-

rate chapter was allocated to each teacher organization in its dealings with the board. Of the four Time 3 chapters, the first chapter deals with union behavior, the second with association behavior, the third with board behavior, and the fourth with association-union relationships. Union behavior is presented first because it was this group which first took the initiative in disrupting the school system and which engineered the bilateral agreement between itself and the school board. The association behavior is presented second because it substantially followed the union's militant lead, although using different tactics vis-à-vis the school board. The school board behavior is presented third because, as in Time 2, its mode of behavior is essentially reactive to the militancy of both the union and the association. The fourth Time 3 chapter deals with the association-union relationships and, like its Time 2 chapter, attempts to present and discuss the behavior involved in this special case of in-group competition within the party that traditionally had inferior power.

REFERENCES

¹ Our conception of power is, in the first instance, a dispositional one, similar to other dispositional characteristics like "knowledge," "longing," etc. See Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), p. 116.

² Max Weber's definition of power in *On Law in Economy and Society*, ed. and annotated by Max Rheinstein, trans. Edward Shils and Max Rheinstein (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 322-330, involves "the probability that one actor in a social relationship will . . . carry out his own will." The problem with his position is, however, that it omits the *levels* of power possessed by parties in a relationship which, we would maintain, can range from a lop-sided imbalance to relative *equality* in power levels. What Weber is talking about in his conception of power is a power relationship where one party will carry out his own will over another party with whom it is interacting. This is only one kind of a power relationship and it leaves no room for the possibility of interaction between power equals. Our position is that once a power relationship exists the *differential* in power possessed by the interacting parties is what is relevant, for given the presence or absence, growth or decline of such a differential, one can expect distinctly different modes of behavior to be engaged in by the principal parties. And just because a power differential is absent even when, for example, the respective power levels of two interacting parties is high and equal, we would emphatically deny that it means the parties have no power as Weber implies, and as Gerth and Mills and Blau explicitly say; for in many instances either party could still disrupt the system of which both are a part (cf. footnote 4).

³In connection with this, it is important to note, that when we say, later on, that the union did this, or the association did this, or the board said this, we are not reifying a concept or anthropomorphizing a collective entity. Rather, we are bowing to common usage, and specifically state here that it is only individuals who act in their organizational role and we merely inject the use of metonymy for the sake of simplicity. On the other hand, when we seem to endow one of the organizations above with a touch of human life, we are merely indulging in the use of personification, a minor bit of literary license.

⁴In a recent article by Dennis Wrong, "Some Problems in Defining Social Power," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXXIII, No. 6 (Spring, 1968), he disagrees with Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills in *Character and Social Structure* and Peter Blau in *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), all of whom stress to an extreme the importance of asymmetry in any power relationship. He argues for a division of scopes or spheres of control among parties in a power relationship where a balance of power exists. He calls the kind of power possessed by the parties in such a situation *intercursive power*. Wrong says: "Intercursive power exists where the power of each party in a relationship is counter-vailed by that of the other, with procedures for bargaining on joint decision making governing their relations when matters affecting the goals and interests of both are involved." Although we have not used this term in our analysis, it does describe exactly the type of power beginning to be possessed by the principal parties in the latter part of Time 2 and possessed in Time 3, the power differential elimination period.

Chapter III

TIME 1

THE TRADITIONAL POWER DIFFERENTIAL: BOARD BEHAVIOR

A school board receives its mandate from the state. The state, however, delegates this authority to local municipalities and within certain boundaries allows them to decide how their local schools will be run, how much the staff will be paid, what will be taught, whom will be hired, and how much will be spent to get the job done. This task is executed on the local level by a board of education which is either elected or appointed.

In Stonehedge the school board is composed of nine members, elected by the city's voters for varying terms of from one to three years. Once a year at the annual reorganization meeting near the end of February a president and vice-president are elected by the board members. In order to cope efficiently with the volume of issues that confront the board, the president at this time, or shortly thereafter, divides the board into about nine committees covering the important decision-making areas, e.g., Finance Committee, Buildings and Grounds Committee, Policy Committee, Transportation Committee, etc. The committees do the research and fact finding on an issue and come up with recommendations to the board as a whole. In a plenary session the board then votes on the recommendations which, if passed, are carried out by the superintendent

of schools, the chief executive officer and primary professional resource person of the board, or by the secretary of the board who is the chief business agent of the board, or by the appropriate employee who is responsible for implementing the particular kind of decision made by the board.

The board has public meetings at least once a month and special meetings as often as is necessary and any decision becomes official when it is recorded in the minutes of the meeting. This, in general is the gross framework within which the board operates and within which the following question will be explored:¹

What type of behavior does the board engage in when it has superior power and the teachers inferior power?

Equality—Teachers and Janitors

In Time 1 there is evidence to suggest that as far as the board was concerned, the teachers were not substantially differentiated as a professional group from the non-professional employees of the board. For example: (1) in 1944 the starting pay for a new teacher with a bachelor's degree was \$1,400 for the elementary, and \$1,500 for the high school, while the starting pay for a full-time janitor who could read and write was \$1,800 (his was a 12-month appointment); (2) in 1944, and in at least three subsequent years in Time 1, when the board gave the teachers a \$100 across-the-board raise, it gave the janitors the same raise; and (3) for about 90 percent of the Time 1 period the board committee that handled the personnel affairs for the board was officially called *The Teachers and Janitors Committee*. This appears to be a somewhat symbolic index of the manner in which teachers were regarded by the board.

Ignoring the Teachers

In Time 1 there were many other indices of the board's generally low regard for the teachers. One way, for example, that the board acted which kept the teachers in the dark was to decide things of direct relevance to the teachers without seeking their opinions or even informing them of the issue under consideration. In other words, the board ignored the teachers.

An instance of this occurred early in 1956 when the board approved the requisition of furniture for the teachers' room in the high school. The committee to select the furniture did not have one teacher on it. Another example along this line was the establishment in the latter part of Time 1 of the Citizens Advisory Committee on School Expansion to which no teacher was appointed initially. However, seven days after the appointments were made, an additional name of a teacher was put forth.

For the 18-year duration of Time 1, there were also 13 instances of the board's informing the teachers *ex post facto* of the new salary guide for the following budget year. In Time 1 no fiction was maintained that the teachers ever really negotiated with the board.

Request Denied

Besides these ways of systematically ignoring the teachers, the board had a battery of responses to any approach by a teacher or group of teachers.

Sometimes a rather blunt response was used, as in the case of a group of Jewish teachers who petitioned to be excused from the school, without a pay deduction, in order to attend to their religious duties; or in the case of the request by the teachers for 20 equal pay periods; or in the early requests by teachers for a single salary guide. The requests were denied.

Clerical Limbo

A more ambiguous, more refined, and more tactful range of negative responses was used much more often than this type of clear unambiguous denial.

Among these was the *clerical limbo* tactic—the assignation of requests, position papers, reports, and studies to the file. If any letter or document sent to the board did not positively have to be answered, it would usually be read aloud at the board meeting, then filed. This read-and-file routine was an effective way of doing nothing about the problems presented in most letters and other written documentation sent to the board.

This mode of dispatching problems to *limbo* also occurred quite frequently whenever the board responded that a problem was

"under advisement." A similar reply, and equally noncommittal, was the response by the board that a particular problem "is being studied," or that a report on that issue was "due in a couple of months." Since most parties use up their burst of passion for a cause with a single effort, delay mechanisms like the above seemed to eliminate efficiently most kinds of pressure on the board.

The following table shows the board responses to 19 letters from individual teachers. These were all of the individual teacher letters recorded in the minutes of the Board of Education during this period.

<i>Board response</i>	<i>No.</i>
Approved	3
Clerical limbo	9
Request denied	6
No record	1
	—
	19

Promises and No Payoff

A potentially more dangerous, less common, but equally negative type of response of the board was to promise teachers things and then forget that the promises were made or, when the promises fell due, to declare the situation as so radically changed that implementation was not possible. This type of board behavior occurred in Stonehedge periodically. An interesting example occurred in 1958 when the board promised to create a new salary guide by the 1961-1962 school year. When 1961 came, the teachers asked for a \$400 adjustment for every teacher. The board raised the minimum starting salary from \$4,100 to \$4,400 and created a new guide that matched the old guide at the fifth step. The teachers were outraged at this action, so to pacify them the board promised to adjust this unfairness with the 1962-1963 budget, a year later, which was sufficient motivation to get the teachers to help work for the passage of the 1961-1962 budget.

Placation by Resolution

Another type of behavior the board engaged in was less a negative response than an elaborate delay mechanism. Occasionally the teachers came up with what the board admitted was a good idea and the board would adopt a resolution favoring the recommended idea; then not act. Three examples of this type of board behavior are found in Time 1. In 1947 the board approved a proposal to give teachers credit for graduate work, but established no efficient machinery to see to its enactment. As a consequence, the proposal was not implemented until 1951, four years later. This same pattern of behavior occurred numerous times in Time 2, as will be discussed later.

Similar to this phenomenon of placation by resolution is a type of *payoff by resolution*. Although only one example of this was found, it is, nevertheless, a type of behavior of some interest. In 1954-1955 the board recorded in its minutes that that year was one of the most trying for the Stonehedge educational system and in gratitude, the board passed a resolution "testifying to its respect and esteem for the untiring zeal of the school employees." Although many of the teachers appreciated the board's kind words and its awareness of the teachers' hard work, some of the teachers would have liked a more tangible token of appreciation, e.g., an increase of salaries.

Committees and Cooling the Mark Out*

In the late fall of each year the teachers' representatives would suggest improvements in the salary guide to the board. The typical position of the board, apart from outright denial of such requests, was usually to offer some small increase that would allow it to maintain at least a minimum competitiveness. Invariably it would argue for the unfeasibility of the large increases that the teachers wanted and plead for the need of more precise information on what other districts were doing. This led in two instances to a proposal for the establishment of a salary survey committee. Since the teachers were

* Method of board behavior that provided a face-saving opportunity for the teachers so that their failure in pressuring the board did not have to be defined as such.

willing to agree to any offer that even suggested the possibility of improvement, they could not turn the proposal down. It also gave them some kind of tangible board movement which the teacher representatives could report to their membership as gain.

Two interesting examples of this pattern which accentuated what the Salary Survey Committee's *real* function was occurred in 1957 and in early 1961. In January 1957 the teachers did not obtain the adjustments that they wanted. To cope with the obvious dissatisfaction of the teachers, the board established a Salary Committee composed of teachers, board members, and administrators who would survey salaries and recommend proposals to be included in the following year's budget. Eleven months later, however, the board unilaterally announced the new salary scale ignoring the Salary Survey Committee which it had established to help in the task.

A similar instance occurred in the spring of 1961. The teachers' representatives kept pressing the board to rectify the inequities in the salary guide that the board had just established. The board appointed a committee composed of three members of the association, three of the union, and three administrators to survey salaries. Its recommendations, like those of its predecessor, were also ignored. This again is a classic example of the cooling out pattern through the committee route.²

Diversionsary Involvement

Related to the utilization of committees to generate the illusion that one is seriously influencing decision making is the use of a broader based tactic, curriculum revision.

The data suggest that the first time this occurred in Stonehedge was in the fall of 1960 when the superintendent of schools reported to the board that the entire staff was working on a curriculum revision study. While it was going on, it did help to keep the teachers' morale up and gave them the feeling that finally their professional opinions were going to be seriously countenanced. This curriculum revision study, however, like so many after it, went the way of so many other study committees before it—into clerical limbo.

Cooptation

As far as the teachers were concerned, a less distasteful tactic of the board, but one quite harmful to the teacher organizations, was the practice of cooptation³—the practice of employers promoting effective union leaders into managerial positions. This has the two-fold consequence of allowing the employer to use the obvious talent and leadership displayed by the man on its side and, of course, of weakening the union. This same pattern was quite common in Stonehedge for over 70 percent of the former top officials (presidents and vice-presidents) in the teachers' association and the teachers' union were promoted to administrative positions. This particular pattern became pronounced in the latter stages of Time 1. Whether the objective of the board in fostering this practice was really to weaken the teacher organizations is difficult to say, since the candidates in all probability would have been promoted anyway. The important point is that it had the effect of coopting the cream of the teacher organization leadership and in some periods it took years for other leaders to emerge.

The board also employed other tactics to prevent the teachers from mobilizing their strength; some of the more subtle modes revolved around time.

Protest and Preventive Timing

In many cases where the board foresaw the probability of handing down an unfavorable decision it would drag out a controversy over many months, and sometimes years. One possible reason for this is that time not only dulls the passion of an outraged suitor, but requires on the part of a suitor a great deal of psychic energy and purpose which most are not willing to invest in a drawn-out controversy.

It also appears, if the board was constrained to render an unfavorable decision which affected the teachers, that the board found it was in its own best interest to inform the concerned parties about it during a vacation, when it was difficult to mobilize the teachers for anything.

An early instance of this occurred in 1945 when, after a stormy controversy that lasted many months over whether a teacher should

have changed the grades of a son of a member of the board of education, the board rendered an unfavorable decision in the month of July to the union which supported the teacher. By the time September rolled around the controversy was dulled and the teachers were in the throes of preparing for a new school year.

Shuffling the Salary Guide

Another interesting behavior manifested by the board was the shuffling of the salary guide. The board published its salary guide early in 1958. It offered a minimum of \$4,200 for a beginning teacher, increments of \$300, and a maximum that would remain at \$7,000, the same as the previous year. The teachers, of course, complained, noting that 30 teachers at the maximum salary would get no increase. In response, the board raised the maximum to \$7,150 and reduced the minimum to \$4,100. While not changing the total amount allocated to salaries, the board got the money to increase the maximum by \$150 by reducing the minimum \$100. This little reshuffle generated sufficient improvement to placate the teachers and did not cost the board anything more. It was not, however, as simpleminded an operation as it might seem because a salary guide is a reasonably complex document that is composed of many steps, sometimes unequal intervals between them, and different tracks. This is further complicated when significant proportions of the teachers are not "on guide," that is, they are getting paid less than they ought. A teacher group could, therefore, easily be presented with an alternative guide by the board that apparently seemed good but which on careful examination would turn out to be less than satisfactory.

Budgets, Deadlines, and the Plea for Time

In addition to establishing school policy and making decisions on a complex spectrum of education problems, the single most important task of the school board is to develop and adopt the school budget. The process typically begins early in the spring when estimates of needed money are submitted by supervisory employees. These data would be collected, collated, and organized into a tenta-

tive budget. The tentative budget would then be moved by the board's budget committee for adoption by the board as a whole. This would be before the date when, by law, the board is required to submit the budget to the County Superintendent of Schools for approval, usually around December 20. In the middle of January two public hearings are held so anyone who has any questions or objections to the budget can make his case. Finally, at the last public hearing, usually near the end of January, the budget is officially adopted by the board. About two weeks later a referendum is held and the taxpayer approves or rejects the budget as well as elects school board members for the following year.⁴

This is the budgetary framework within which both teachers and school boards must act in their discussions over teacher salaries and benefits. The beauty of it, as far as the board was concerned, was that it had built-in deadlines which the board could strategically use in order to minimize the influence of the teachers. Many times the teachers would ask for a meeting with the board to discuss salaries in early November. The board would usually delay in responding and set the date for a meeting close to the date when the tentative budget had to be submitted to the County Superintendent, around December 20. The teachers would present their testimony to the board, the board would listen, the meeting would adjourn and the board would let December 20 descend upon them. On that date the board would submit the tentative budget, invariably unaltered by teacher influence. Once the budget was in the hands of the County Superintendent and approved, the board had semi-official justification for not changing it to suit the teachers. The interesting twist in all this is that the board would frequently tell the teachers that they presented their proposals to the board too late for them to be incorporated into the budget. In the latter part of Time 1 when the teachers finally realized that the budget could be changed right up to the board's official adoption of it, usually around January 25, similar delays were used by the board in setting meeting times with the teachers. Consequently, the influence of the teachers on the budget was minimal and the tentative budget produced by the board's finance committee rarely underwent a substantial change before official adoption.

Ritual Testimony

Similar to the results obtained by delaying an encounter with teacher representatives and connected with the maintenance of the fiction that the teachers' views were seriously considered in developing the budget was the ritual testimony that occurred when both parties met. As suggested above, the teachers rarely influenced the budget seriously, yet perennially they met with the board at budget time in the hope of obtaining improvements. Since the tentative budget was already prepared by the time they met with the board, putting forth their proposals proved usually to be an exercise in public speaking for their representatives. At best, their influence would be felt not for the budget year under discussion but for the following budget year. One minor example of the effect the board thought the teachers would have on the tentative budget was indicated by a note found in the official minutes of the board. It reads: "It was decided to meet with the Salary Committees of various groups of employees on December 27, 1956, after which the board would tentatively adopt its '57-'58 budget." This note indicates that the tentative budget which the finance committee prepared would be adopted, for the simple reason that if any of the increments suggested by any of the salary committees from the various employee groups were adopted, a complex recalculation of the entire budget would have been required. This did not occur and the tentative budget was adopted as proposed by the finance committee. This demonstrated that the board had no intention by December 27 of changing the budget; and that the meeting with the salary committees was calculated to placate them and foster the illusion that their proposals would be taken seriously.

This pattern occurred repeatedly throughout Time 1, but in 1956 the board injected an insulation factor. Instead of having the board as a whole listen to the requests of the teachers and other employee groups, the board appointed a salary committee of three from its ranks to hear them. The advantage of the committee for the board was that the committee could not commit the board to a course of action, it could only report what had transpired to the board when it met in a plenary session. If the board as a whole acted in a manner contrary to the teachers' wishes, the board's

salary committee had the excuse of saying they did all they could for the teachers, but the majority overruled them. The teachers would also learn of the board's decision after the fact, when there was little they could do about it.

It is clear that throughout Time 1 the board was in the ascendancy. Below is a list of the patterns of board behavior found in the Time 1 period. The number of behavior events that empirically ground each pattern is indicated next to each in parentheses.

Equality—teachers and janitors (9); ignoring the teachers (15); request denied (10); clerical limbo (15); promises and no payoff (3); placation by resolution (3); payoff by resolution (1); committees and cooling the mark out (2); diversionary involvement (1); cooptation (8); protest and preventive timing (1); dragging out a controversy (2); shuffling the salary guide (2); budgets, deadlines, and the plea of time (13); and ritual testimony (26).

REFERENCES

¹ This pattern is essentially the same throughout the United States. See Charles F. Reeves, *School Boards: Their Status, Functions and Activities* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1954); and Ronald Corwin, *A Sociology of Education* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965), p. 30.

² This is a variation on Erving Goffman's article, "Cooling the Mark Out," *Psychiatry*, XV, No. 4 (November, 1952), pp. 451-463.

³ This is a variation on a concept that was first used seriously as a research tool by Philip Selznick in *TVA and the Grassroots* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949).

⁴ Robert E. Doherty and Walter E. Oberer, *Teachers, School Boards and Collective Bargaining* (New York: Cornell University, 1967), pp. 78-79, 86.

Chapter IV

TIME 1 THE TRADITIONAL POWER DIFFERENTIAL: TEACHER BEHAVIOR

What kinds of behavior does a party with inferior power engage in against a party with superior power? To put the question more specifically, what kinds of behavior do teachers engage in against the school board when the teachers have inferior power and the school board superior power?

Time 1 is the period when the mode of decision making by the board is unilateral and the relative influence of the teachers on board decisions is minimal. Time 1, according to our assumptions, is also the period when the teachers possess individualized inferior power. This means that although the teachers can be viewed as a reasonably homogeneous entity, in their relationships with the board they do not act collectively as an entity but rather as individuals. This is the general situation that prevailed in Time 1.

One factor that at first might seem to negate the notion that the teachers in Stonehedge did not have individualized inferior power but did have collective power was that from 1945 on, two teacher organizations existed, the association and the union, and most of the teachers belonged to one or the other organization. The facts were, however, that the association was an administration-dominated organization in which the teachers played a negligible

role and which, as a matter of fact, did little for the teachers. Most of the teachers were simply dues-payers and belonged because it was expected of them. In addition, the union, throughout its Time 1 existence, was the minority organization whose membership was significantly confined to the high school and despite an occasional vigorous exercise of protest by a small clique of militants, it did not enjoy broad-based support. The teachers, as individuals, were consequently constrained to fend for themselves.

The Individual Entrepreneur and Inferiority

In studying the 19 instances in Time 1 when individuals on their own initiated some form of protest or made some request, a number of interesting patterns revealed themselves. The board in some instances acceded to the requests, e.g., when a teacher was inadvertently put on the wrong step of the salary scale. These cases were usually oversights on the part of the board or the staff and the board was quite happy to rectify the situation. On the other hand, if an individual suggested that the board do something new, change a policy or set a precedent, the probability of the board's conceding was very low. In addition to six cases of outright denial, nine requests went the clerical limbo route. In these cases the manifest lack of power of the individual teacher revealed itself. Confronted with an unfavorable decision or the time-consuming delay tactics of the board, the individual teacher had no effective lever to get the board to bend to his wishes. His awareness of this had a number of interesting consequences: (1) it apparently reduced the number of instances where a teacher was willing to pursue an issue with the board; (2) it fostered a fear of retaliation among the teachers; and (3) since they were generally unwilling to be labeled as trouble-makers, most preferred to slide into the faceless middle of the teaching staff, and direct their complaints laterally. This, of course, generated a collective passivity among them and buttressed the superordinate position of the board.

The Deference of the Depressed

An index of the subordinate position in which the teachers held themselves and the superordinate position that was conceded to the

board is reflected in the deference accorded to the board.¹ In Stonehedge, many of the letters to the board from both individuals and the teacher representatives revealed this deferential posture. Many were similar and even more obsequious than the one sent, for example, in early Time 1 by two teachers requesting the termination of their leaves of absence and asking for "the privilege of returning to teach in September," or the one in 1953 sent by a chairman of a teacher salary committee which profusely thanked the board "for their kind consideration and cooperation with the proposed salary scale," or in the one in 1959 from a president of a teacher organization which made a big point out of how "we as teachers serve you and your children."

A number of interesting items listed in the fifth anniversary report of the union suggest the level of depression experienced by the teachers for many long years. The peroration at the end of this report also reveals the prevailing deference pattern that existed then. This report listed the things that were regarded as significant wins by the union and by inference one can get an idea of what the situation of the teachers was before these were won. Some of the key wins were: (1) Discontinuance of withholding of substitutes' pay from the monthly salaries of teachers absent from duty because of illness. (2) Liberalization of leave due to death in the family. Strange as it may seem, it had been quite difficult for a teacher to be excused for this reason without being docked. (3) Institution of a single salary schedule. Prior to this time, a considerable amount of individual entrepreneurship was involved in obtaining increases. Teachers with the same number of years of experience and with the same degree of education could be making different salaries. There were, for example, differences between grade and high school, and even sex differences. The single salary scale changed this and ensured equal pay for equal qualifications. (4) Procurement of lavatory facilities for the teachers in one school. The lavatory facilities in this grade school had all been children's size. (5) The last gain in the union report was: the freedom from fear and sense of security due to union affiliations. This so-called achievement was, however, more of a dream than a reality. As recently as February 1968 some individuals among the teachers were afraid to sign their names to a grievance and pursue it to its resolution.

At the bottom of the fifth anniversary report is this note:

The Stonehedge Teachers' Union wishes to take this opportunity to acknowledge that the above accomplishments could not have been realized in so short a time without the gracious cooperation of the Board of Education and the guidance and wisdom of the Superintendent.

This statement manifests: (1) great deference granted to the board and the superintendent; (2) an admission by the union that it had not the vigor, push, or imagination necessary to get these things itself; and (3) its lack of power.

Defeat and Acceptance; Rally 'Round the Budget

When an individual or the representatives of an organization are in a state of acute relative deprivation and are powerless to do anything about it, almost any concession granted to them would help to ameliorate their situation. This helps to explain why after asking their superiors for barely minimal advances, they are grateful when any increment is given.

In Stonehedge a somewhat analogous pattern occurred during Time 1. After the teachers would present their proposals for salary improvements, usually a one-shot burst of testimony on their part, the board would subsequently inform the teachers that they could not meet their expectations but could give them a slight advance. Although this did not usually satisfy the teachers, it generally was enough to elicit a letter of thanks and appreciation from them. It was also inevitably sufficient to get the teachers to *rally 'round the budget*; for if they did not, even the few advances they were able to garner could be chopped out of the budget if the electorate did not approve it. This rally 'round the budget routine was, consequently, always a perennial episode and an exciting time of year that had some other important consequences. It stimulated a significant number of the apathetic majority of teachers to bestir themselves to get out the vote. It gave the teachers the feeling they were really in there, fighting for their rights and quality education in Stonehedge. It generated a solidarity with the board in their common effort to get the electorate to support the school system. It also gave

the leadership of the teacher organizations something to do, and presumably helped them forget how uninfluential they had been in developing the budget.

Forms of Protest

During Time 1 the single most frequent way individuals or the representatives of the teacher organizations used to register a demur or a protest with the board was to send the board a letter. It was, as one might suspect, a singularly weak mode of making one's influence felt. There were, however, a number of advantages attached to it for the teachers: (1) it was easy to do, (2) it required a brand of courage of a less vigorous nature to execute than an in-person confrontation, (3) it prevented the embarrassment of being denied something to one's face, and (4) it allowed the leadership in the teacher organizations to point to something tangible that they did. On the other hand, as far as the board was concerned, it made it easier for them to deny the request, procrastinate over it, resign it to clerical limbo, refer it to the wrong committee, lose it, or simply ignore it.

Another form of protest occasionally found was the petition. A petition is really a glorified letter, but its advantage is that not one but many people sign it. It is an expression of solidarity in the face of a common problem and generally prevents retaliation against the signers—the assumption being that if one head rolls, they will all roll. As a form of protest, the petition is, therefore, more formidable than a letter.

Although this form of protest only occurred once during Time 1 in Stonehedge, it is indicative of an important pattern. In 1954 the teachers in one of the grade schools sent a petition to the board signed by all of them, requesting that the lunch period be shortened to one-half hour because of the difficulty in supervising large numbers of children on the playground. The interesting thing about this occurrence is that the teachers did not go to their organizations' representatives but attempted a direct protest themselves. It demonstrated then, indirectly, the ineffectiveness of both the teachers' union and the association in getting things for the teachers, and is an index of their weakness. As far as the outcome of the petition

went, it appears that it slipped into clerical limbo since there is no evidence from a careful examination of the official minutes of the board meetings that anything was ever done about it.

Another way of making one's influence felt was the use of third-party intermediaries of a higher status.² An example of this occurred during Time 1. The teachers in a particular grade school needed a retiring room and they recognized they could not get it themselves, so they used the president of the Parent-Teacher Association as intermediary. The outcome was favorable to the teachers.

It appears that a general conclusion one can draw from the analysis of the Time 1 data collected on third party pressures is that the board was vastly more responsive to groups like the PTA and civic associations than it ever was to the teachers. This fact was not lost on the teachers.

One qualification, however, is that that particular improvement did not cost much money. When the association in the spring of 1959 and the following fall attempted to mobilize broader-based community support for increased salaries, the pressure that was brought to bear on the board was not sufficient to make the board move substantially from holding the line. It appears, therefore, that although generally third party intermediaries of high status are influential, and that the PTA's as a group are reasonably powerful, and that securing broad-based community support is helpful in assisting teachers towards their goal, the single most overriding factor, as far as the board is concerned, appears to be how much it costs. The tradition was always to decide an issue on the side of economy.

Another interesting observation concerning forms of protest during most of Time 1 was the manifest lack of in-person protest exercised by the teachers or their representatives. They had few regular channels where they could do this, but the public board meetings were always opened to them. Apart from their regular use of a short period of the board meeting time during the early winter of a given year to offer the board their salary and welfare proposals, only rarely did they publicly protest anything at a board meeting. This was not because they recognized that open meetings

were a farce and that utilizing them was a waste of time, but rather because the board was held in trepidation.

In the latter part of Time 1, the chairman of the association's salary committee regularly attended board meetings, regularly aired his views, regularly protested unfavorable decisions, and was regularly ignored by the board. It only slowly dawned on him that the real decisions of the board were not made at open meetings, only passed on and defended.³ It took many long years before the leadership of the teachers' organizations recognized this and devised more effective modes of making their influence felt.

Coups and Pseudo-coups

Although the previous picture of the board and teachers' behavior perhaps paints a rather bleak picture of the lot of the teachers, throughout Time 1, especially in the post-World War II period and right up through Time 2 and to the present, there has been a slow but steady advance in salary, benefits, and working conditions for them.⁴ One might, however, counter by the observation that every other occupational group with a similar educational background in the United States work force has not only met but outstripped the teachers in gains. This fact has not been lost on the teachers, but when they confined their range of longitudinal comparisons to within their own occupational group, they saw improvement. On the local level and in Stonehedge, in particular, such progress was usually offered by the leadership of the two teacher organizations as a demonstration of what their organization was doing for the teacher. But some questions could be raised about the clear-cut causal relationship between their so-called "coups" and the contribution these groups made in influencing the board. In terms of these advances it is not, for example, entirely clear: how much was due to the difficulty the administration had in recruiting new teachers; how much was due to the magnitude of the teacher turnover; how much was due to the more progressive members of the board; how much was due to the state or national educational association; how much was due to improvements in other communities; and of course, how much to the general rise in the cost-of-

living. These questions did not, however, prevent the leadership in the teachers' organizations from taking credit for the progress.

Although many of the advances in salary, benefits, and working conditions were real and tangible, the teachers in Stonehedge were willing to celebrate over many board decisions that subsequently turned out to be less than real for them. Instances of this occurred periodically, throughout Time 1, when the board would publish a new salary guide and large numbers of teachers would remain "off guide," i.e., would be paid less than they should have. Another instance related to the naiveté of the teachers in taking the board at its word occurred in early Time 1 when the president of the union complained about the necessity of hiring substitutes in order to avoid doubling up the classes and the teacher load. The board promised that when World War II was over the problem would be solved. In 1967 the problem was still in the air.

Another instance occurred in 1954 when the board assured the teachers that they would get paid for extracurricular activities soon. This promise, which initially enthused the teachers in the union, became a reality 12 years later.

One final example occurred in 1947 when the teachers' union presented a grievance procedure plan to the board; which plan was adopted amidst much mutual congratulation. In 1961, however, since the grievance procedure did not work, they changed the name of it to "improvements program." But futility by any other name still proved to be futility for that was the career of the "improvements program" too.

The Reactive Posture

Related to the foregoing array of relatively sterile modes of teacher behavior toward the board is their generalized orientation which can be designated *the reactive posture*. Instead of presenting a dynamic, vigorous offensive that was persistent, tough, and unyielding, the teachers limited their efforts to an occasional sortie and generally sat around waiting for the board to act.

A series of illustrations demonstrates this point. In late October 1951, a motion to form an association salary committee to meet with the board was tabled at an association meeting. Between that

meeting and December 11, a committee was established, met with the board, and reported that "the board would have something definite to tell us about the new salary schedule." This incident reflects a significant absence of planning, preparation, and persistence on the part of the association leadership and highlights their rather passive pose. A better example of this can be gleaned from a note in the minutes of a 1954 meeting of the Stonehedge union. It reads, "It was decided that the board had actually reopened salary discussions by discussing minimum salaries." At the same meeting is recorded,

A suggestion was also made that the salary committee listen to the board, if and when they are called to a board meeting, and bring back the information to the group for further discussion rather than commit themselves at the first hearing.

Both notes suggest the unstructured nature of the union-board relationship: (1) They had to *decide* that salary discussions were reopened. Obviously it was not mutually agreed on beforehand that this would be the topic of their conversation with the board. It seems, rather, that they fortuitously stumbled into it. (2) "If and when they are called to a board meeting" reflects the rather chancy probability of a meeting and the suggestion to bring back the information the board gives them, suggests their generally reactive posture, and does not even hint at an offensive attitude.

Other instances of either being summoned to a board meeting for discussion or of having a salary scale presented to them by the board occurred 17 times throughout Time 1 for both the association and the union.

Sex and Suppression

A number of factors are related to the generally passive and subservient character of the union and the association. The one which is perhaps the single most important factor is the sex composition of the leadership of both groups. For example, in 1958 for the union, of 16 different official and chairmanship positions for the union, only four of these were occupied by men. In 1952 for the association, of 25 different official and chairmanship positions, only

two were occupied by men. These figures, of course, reflect the overwhelming preponderance of women teachers in Stonehedge during the Time 1 period. It also is interesting to note that the board, during most of its Time 1 existence, never had, of its nine members, more than one female member at any one time, and for a period of 14 years from 1942 to 1956 had an entirely male membership.⁵

However, the interesting question that all this raises about the behavior of the teachers, and in particular about the teacher organizations, is: if they did not spend much time and effort in bread-and-butter activities vis-à-vis the board, what did they do? It appears that they engaged in a whole range of social and eleemosynary activities that reflected the interest of their membership, e.g., card parties; food, orchid, and apron sales to raise money for their scholarship funds; fashion shows, theater trips; dinner parties; dark-horse projects—prizes at each monthly meeting for some member who attended; the plaque committees—project to honor the war dead; educationally uplifting programs; and the perennial favorite, the sunshine committee.

In Time 3, when the teachers actually demonstrated their power, the leadership sex ratios had shifted radically to a male predominance. The nature of the activities that were considered important also changed with collective negotiations with the board having first priority.

Below is compiled a list of teacher behaviors found in Stonehedge during this Time 1 period. Next to each category are the number of behavior events collected that empirically ground each pattern.

The individual entrepreneur and inferiority (16); the deference of the depressed (12); defeat and acceptance (26); rally 'round the budget (32); forms of protest—letters (11), petition (1), third party intermediaries (1), and in-person confrontation—its absence, presence, and uselessness (10); coups and pseudo-coups (19); the reactive posture (5); sex and suppression (15).

REFERENCES

¹ For analogous situations, see Erving Goffman, "The Nature of Deference and Demeanor," *American Anthropologist*, LVIII (June, 1956), pp. 474-502.

² This is a mode of behavior that is a predominant theme in many cultures. See, for example, Frank Lynch, S. J., "Lowland Philippine Values: Social Acceptance," *Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Baguio Religious Acculturation Conference* (Manila: BRAC, 1961), pp. 100-120.

³ Ronald G. Corwin, *A Sociology of Education* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965), p. 319.

⁴ Arthur W. Foshay (ed.), *The Rand McNally Handbook of Education* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1963).

⁵ Other characteristics of the board, like socioeconomic status, probably influenced the nature of the board's relationships with the teachers. To what extent this was so in Stonehedge we cannot say, since we were unable to gather any systematic information on the board's socioeconomic background. We are inclined to agree, though, that over the years the majority of them were from the upper middle class. This is what George Counts found in *The Social Composition of School Boards*, University of Chicago Supplementary Educational Monograph, No. 33 (1937); and later W. W. Charters, in "Social Class Analysis and the Control of Public Education," *Harvard Educational Review*, XXIII (Fall, 1953), p. 272.

TIME 1

THE TRADITIONAL POWER DIFFERENTIAL: ASSOCIATION- UNION RELATIONSHIPS

In Stonehedge two teacher organizations existed from 1945 on and throughout the remainder of Time 1. The previous two chapters help to demonstrate the weakness of both teacher organizations vis-à-vis the school board. This weakness was rooted in the inability of the teacher organizations to mobilize effectively the fragmented individualized inferior power of the teachers into any substantial collective pressure; from this it is reasonable to conclude that despite the fact that two teacher organizations existed on the books, and that the teacher group divided its dues between them, nevertheless, the individual teacher was still largely constrained to fight his own battles. The important reason, therefore, why the origination of two competing teacher organizations did not suggest that the Time 2 period should have been pushed back to that point was that in no substantial way did their existence alter the traditional power differential where the school board had superior power and the teachers individualized inferior power. In particular, their presence in no way altered the autonomous unilateral mode of decision making by the board.

Since these two groups did exist during Time 1 and did have important contributions to make in eventually altering the power

relationship between them and the board in Time 2 and Time 3, it is important to see how their relationships with each other developed, as well as their mode of dealing with their common adversary, the board.

Unity

Prior to the beginning of the union in 1945, the association was the only teacher organization in the Stonehedge system. The vast majority of the teachers were members, but most of the leadership positions were traditionally occupied by administrators, especially the principals. The association's general stance toward the board was one of utter passivity and it is not overly harsh to say that it was a do-nothing entity. As a matter of fact, it typically met only once or twice a year. It is, therefore, only in this gross sense that it can be said that the professional personnel in Stonehedge were unified into one organization. This unity was really spurious. As a matter of fact, as far as the individual teacher went, he not only was not provided with organizational support in any contest with the board, but frequently, if a teacher had attempted to suggest an improvement to the association leadership which they did not like, he suffered the risk of getting a "dirty schedule," permanent lunch-room duty, moved from his position, or some other unsubtle form of punishment in retaliation.¹

Schism

During the war years five anti-association people got elected to office with the purpose in mind of killing the association—they never called a meeting. Not too many members of the association objected, though, since the association was always practically moribund anyway. Near the end of the war years, however, when one teacher was accused of victimizing a child of a member of the board of education, a stormy controversy arose and the teacher was told by the board and the administration to raise the child's grade. This challenge of the teacher's integrity by the board and the lack of administration support infuriated the segment of the teachers who had taken over the leadership positions in the association as well as

some of their colleagues, and 11 of them left the association *en masse* and chartered a union run by teachers and for teachers only. The vast majority of the elementary school teachers remained in the association while 25 of the high school teachers joined the union.

From that point on in Stonehedge there was a longstanding antagonism between the two teacher organizations as they vied for membership, and influence with the board, a condition which existed to December 1968.

The One-upmanship Game

Although the leadership in both the teachers' organizations recognized that they had very limited influence on the board, nevertheless, they felt constrained to go through the motions one would go through who was really influential, like calling for meetings with the board, for example. Although the meetings that did ensue with the board were generally sterile, in any given year it was always politically expedient to be the first of the two teacher groups to call on the board for a meeting. This simple expression of initiative could then be turned into evidence that the other organization was dragging its heels and that "our" organization was really fighting for the teachers. Success at being first to meet with the board fluctuated from year to year between the two groups.

Another example of one-upmanship was in the area of hospitalization and insurance. The association presented its plan first in 1954, and ten months later the union presented a plan of its own. On the other hand, in 1949 the union put forth the first plan for scholarship awards and in 1952 had its own scholarship fund. Six years later the association inaugurated what it regarded as a professionally altruistic idea—a scholarship fund.

Interorganization Antipathy

Besides playing the one-upmanship game and counting as achievements all kinds of things that entered the purview of the leadership of the union and the association, throughout Time 1 they engaged in a considerable amount of name calling, self-defense, an

occasional irreverent putdown, and frequently some more subtle expressions of their mutual distaste of each other.

In 1954 the union sent a letter to the board urging it to have a policy on substandard certification. In particular, it wanted the board to desist from hiring unqualified teachers. On the face of it, this proposal appeared to be a selfless suggestion to upgrade the quality of the professional personnel and it could be defended on those grounds. However, it happened that the vast majority of the rather large number of teachers who possessed emergency certificates were elementary school teachers, women, and members of the association. Fortuitously, then, the proposal turned out to be for the union an indirect and perfectly defensible threat to the association.

Another interesting episode occurred in 1954. It seemed that the drive to recruit members for the association in some instances thrived under the protective umbrella of certain school principals and that some schools produced a 100 percent association membership only with some coercion. This fact was not lost on the union and it got the board to adopt the following resolutions:

- 1) The Board of Education recognizes the right of teachers to belong to teacher organizations of their choice or not to belong to any organization; and 2) the Board of Education does not condone direct or indirect pressure on school personnel to join any teacher organization.

These resolutions were regarded as a *coup* by the union, a direct affront to the association and a repudiation of some of the tactics they capitalized on. Of course, words do not make reality and the conditions that precipitated the union's dissatisfaction did not disappear—they just became harder to prove.

Coalitions

Although the prevailing orientation of the union to the association and vice versa was one of general antagonism, occasionally they beat their pens into plowshares and attempted to present a united front to the board.² This occurred on five different occasions in Time 1. In 1946 and 1950 they had a joint committee in

pursuit of bonuses. In 1952 they jointly asked the board to pay the teachers twice monthly. In 1955 both groups were summoned by the board and met to "assist" the board in the plan to raise the minimum salary level. In 1958 both groups produced a joint salary proposal for the 1959-1960 budget.

From these occasional attempts at cooperation no lasting coalition formed. Apparently the labor tag of the union was too much for the members of the association and the professionalism of the association too much for the members of the union. A lasting coalition might not have made any difference in their dealings with the board anyway. Acting separately, they had rather little influence on the board and in the five instances noted above where they joined together to confront the board, it is not clear that it really mattered very much.

It appears that the essential reason for their subordinate position is that they did not have the will or the knowledge of how to go about the business of making their wishes prevail over the board's. In other words, they did not know how to take the individualized inferior power of the teachers, mobilize it into a collective entity, and exercise their collective power with vigor. Accompanied by vague notions about the premium put on the cooperative role of the teacher, the feeling that somehow protest was unprofessional, apparently awed by the benevolence of the school board and the "gracious guidance and wisdom" of the superintendent, both the union and the association, essentially female organizations, chose the pacific and compliant route. In Time 1, this was the route that conceded superior power to the board and offered no challenge to it.

The interorganization patterns of relationship between the association and the union are summarized below:

Unity, schism, the one-upmanship game; interorganization antipathy; and coalitions.

REFERENCES

¹ This information was volunteered by a teacher with 42 years of experience in the Stonehedge system.

² This is a type of interorganization behavior that was theorized about by J. D. Thompson and W. J. McEwen, "Organization Goals and Environment," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII (1958), pp. 23-31.

TIME 2

THE POWER DIFFERENTIAL DECLINE: TEACHER BEHAVIOR

In Time 2, the reason teacher behavior is presented before board behavior is because the increase in the level of power between the teachers and the board was experienced by the teachers and the increase in their power level was accompanied by new modes of behavior. On the other hand, the board behavior in Time 2 was a combination of old modes of behavior discussed in previous chapters and new reactive modes stimulated by the new expressions of teacher behavior. To understand the latter, it is important to be aware of the former.

The question of interest in this chapter is therefore: what kinds of behavior do teachers with individualized inferior power engage in when they begin to mobilize this power into a collective force and exercise it in their dealings with the board of education? The data suggested that this period, when the teachers first began to exert some vigorous collective pressure, occurred in late 1961 and lasted through the spring of 1966.

One of the things that distinguishes this period from Time 1 is precisely that the individual teacher readily and regularly utilizes the union or the association to act on his behalf.

The United Movement

The united movement in early Time 2 among the school employees of Stonehedge developed as a consequence of promises unfilled, rights aborted, years of being ignored, and the long experience of board delay tactics to the point of impotence. In the fall of 1961 both teacher organizations, first separately and later conjointly with other school employees, decided to rectify the situation.

In 1960 the union was told by the board it had submitted its salary proposals too late to be included in the 1960-1961 budget. In order to preclude the possibility of the board's offering a similar argument for the 1961-1962 budget, the union submitted its proposals in September, four months before the budget had to be officially adopted. The association, on the other hand, mobilized a broad-based community effort to bring pressure on the board to raise salaries. It got practically every parent-teacher organization in town to write on its behalf to the board as well as to the local newspapers. It even got the support of the Stonehedge Administrators' Association. All of this effort did not overly impress the board, for as of December 17 not only had no discussions with the board ensued, but the board did not even respond. As a consequence, the United School Employees of Stonehedge was formed. It included principals, teachers, custodial employees, clerks, helping teachers, and nurses. The Executive Committee consisted of the president who was a member of the union, and the salary committee chairman of each group.

The first order of business for the group was a telegram of protest; a slight advance over their traditional letter protests. It vigorously objected to their exclusion from a meeting on the budget between the board and the town council. The second order of business was to attend the public board meeting on December 20. The tactics proposed to the group were:

- 1) be quiet and listen to what they have to say; 2) when the meeting is opened to the public for questions and discussions, we will ask questions; and 3) keep your heads, don't get aggravated and at all costs, stick together.

The president maintained that their main objective was the right to negotiate, then salaries. Independently, the association membership

voted to obtain the aid of a lawyer to secure the salary adjustments proposed.

At the first public meeting of the board, the United School Employees did as they planned. In general, it was a vigorous in-person confrontation, a further advance over their usual mode. The discussions revolved around the board's obligation, or lack of it, to solicit its employees' views on salaries before the new budget was adopted. At this first meeting the board members did not commit themselves but said that they would give an answer on the question before their next meeting. Shortly after that, the board decided that it would meet with the United School Employees at its next public meeting. The strategy of the United School Employees was to insist that the board meet with the entire group of representatives when it confronted the board. At the next meeting the board refused to meet with the employee representatives as a body and insisted that each group talk separately with the board. The United School Employees stuck to its plan and refused to talk with the board individually. Nothing was accomplished at this meeting, but the United group began getting favorable publicity and a great deal of sympathy from many quarters. As a consequence, at the following meeting the board met with 15 representatives of the joint employee group. The upshot of the protests in which the president of the United group and the field representative from the state association played an important role was that the board improved the salaries over the preceding years to the teachers, principals, department heads, and custodians. But this appeared to be more of a result of the earlier campaign than the United movement. No improvements were offered to the clerks, an all female group, and no hospitalization benefits were given to any group even though all the other public employees in the town had them. The board was not disposed toward further improvements and, in general, the school employees were dissatisfied.

This brief episode suggests a few conclusions about exactly what the teachers did and what they accomplished. *Teachers* is used advisedly here, since they were the ones who were the organizing force, the chief spokesmen for the group, and constituted the vast proportion of the group's membership. First of all, they got the board to meet with them—no mean accomplishment under the

circumstances. Secondly, they got the board to agree that they should be consulted about developing the budget—a significant concession also considering the circumstances. Thirdly, they got the board to reverse its position concerning its refusal to meet with the entire United group. Reversing itself was not something the board was accustomed to doing—especially at the behest of its employees. Fourthly, they got the board to improve salaries from the previous year—something the board might have done anyway but did not appear to be doing. Fifthly, they engaged in an array of new modes of protest, i.e., they sent telegrams, a form of communication that had a greater sense of urgency and gravity than letters; they mobilized third party support; wrote press releases and obtained favorable newspaper coverage; they employed the expertise of the state association's field representative; the association even agreed to secure a lawyer, a tack that proved useless; and above all, they acted and stood together in the confrontations with the board as a collective entity to a degree that they had never before been able to achieve.

Despite this rather diverse battery of methods used to make their wishes prevail over the board, they did not fully succeed in their objectives. It appears that the single most important reason for this was that they had not yet come to a point where they were willing as a collectivity to disrupt the school system. In any event, the United movement proved to be good practice for the teacher organization leadership and it demonstrated to the individual school employee that acting in a unit, he need not fear the board.

The end of this episode found the board and the United group joined together in their fight against new villains, the mayor and town council, who cut \$300,000 from the school budget after it was defeated twice at the polls.¹

The Checkoff and Stability

The United movement episode demonstrated to the teacher organizations the necessity of having a solid enduring organizational base that was always there and not only extant when a crisis arose. Consequently, they petitioned the board for the "checkoff."

One of the prime difficulties for any employee organization is the collection of dues to support the organization. Strange as it may seem, even though employees might favor an organization's fighting on their behalf, traditionally they have been reluctant to hand over regular weekly, monthly, quarterly, or even yearly cash payments as dues. This, of course, gives the organization a very shaky and somewhat unpredictable financial base. To cope with this problem, union leaders in their dealings with management have always made the checkoff one of their prime goals. The checkoff refers to the written permission that a union member gives his employer to deduct the dues to the union from his salary. The employer then transmits the entire sum of collected dues to the union. The practice, as far as the employees are concerned, seems to be a reflection of the old adage "what you don't see, you don't miss," for they invariably prefer this method of dues payment and are quite willing to cooperate. It also is a boon to the union leaders since they do not have to spend their time collecting dues. In addition, it affords the organization a considerable degree of stability.

In Stonehedge both of the teacher organizations wanted the board to agree to the checkoff, and in the summer of 1962 it was so granted. This concession allowed the teacher organizations to mobilize and hold their members in a way they had not been able to before.

Two interesting indices of the consequences that the checkoff had for both organizations were: before the checkoff, leaders in both teacher organizations described their activities as a "suitcase operation." This means their organization's resources were not only small, but also had no permanent locus as it shifted to the residences of each new set of elected officials. In 1962 the union opened an office, as did the association in 1963. These events gave the membership of both organizations visible symbols of their organizations' existence as well as efficient bases from which the leadership could conduct their activities.

The other difference noted in the after-the-checkoff period was the radical increase in organizational literature emanating from the respective headquarters. Whereas, before the checkoff came a typical yearly output of literature for each organization would be a very thin folder in its files (e.g., 1959-1960), after the checkoff, a

steady stream of newsletters, information bulletins, and assorted propaganda for a given year could only be contained in folders that were thick and bulging. Granted, this is a very crude measure of the increase in written communication directed at members and potential members, but it does, nevertheless, point up an important consequence of the checkoff.

The recruitment of new members was also facilitated since all a new member had to do was to check a box on a card indicating the teacher organization of his choice, sign his name giving the board secretary permission to deduct his dues, and he was a member.

Preparations, Persistence, and Payoff

In Time 1 frequently a salary committee was thrown together in November, met two or three times among themselves, and then met with the board once to present their salary proposals.

In the early part of Time 2, the teacher organizations not only started their preparations in September and prepared extensively for their meetings with the board, but usually presented a complex list of proposals covering a wide array of benefits that they wanted discussed. It was also early in this period that the term "negotiations" first began to be used regularly. Although "negotiations," as such, with the board were still more of a dream than a reality, it indicated the direction the teachers wanted to go in their dealings with the school board. Nevertheless, this increased level of activity and more central focus on bread-and-butter issues on the part of the teacher organizations brought considerable improvement in many areas, e.g., salary, sick leave, hospitalization, personal days off, and tuition payment.

One gain which the union won after it changed the name of its "improvements program" back to "grievance procedure" and after it pursued a case for a grievor for a year and a half (which, incidentally it lost) was to obtain a grievance procedure with definite time limits between the steps. This and all of the other gains presaged a period of even greater achievement for both teacher organizations.

Action Programs and Influence

In the beginning of 1964, the teacher organizations, building on the experiences of early Time 2, leaned a little more heavily on the board and got it to agree to significant improvements for the following budget year. The teachers recognized, however, that just because the board agreed to these improvements and incorporated them in the budget it did not mean that they were a reality. They had to convince the voters who could approve or veto the budget in the annual school election. In 1964 the rally 'round the budget routine was, consequently, taken a little more seriously by the teacher organizations and the board, because they had recently seen the surgical job the town council performed on the 1962-1963 budget. As a consequence, the Stonehedge union mobilized its resources to get out the vote while the Stonehedge teachers' association inaugurated its "joint action program." The "joint action" referred to the combined efforts of the state education association, the board, administration, and the teachers' association. Interestingly enough, the union was not invited to join. The motto of the program was: "joined for action, not words." Their program consisted of a systematic schedule of press releases, advertisements, an information brochure, and a comprehensive telephone campaign. Some of these things the association had learned from the union. Independently, the teachers' association and the union kept the heat on the board members to convince them not to change their minds.

Despite this great outpouring of energy on the part of all of the parties, the budget was not approved by the electorate. It came back to the board and the board had to decide whether to cut the budget or resubmit it as it was to the voters a second time. The representatives of the union, the teachers' association, the principals' association, the school clerks' and secretaries' union, and the janitors' union all argued with the board and presented statements and resolutions urging the board to resubmit the defeated budget in the original amounts. In addition, the field representative of the state education association read a statement pointing out that

the education association was prepared to impose professional sanctions on the township of Stonehedge if political action is used to defeat the budget at the second election and as a result of this the budget is cut by the town council.

At the end of this meeting the motion to resubmit the budget "as is" was defeated and a significant cut introduced.

When the budget went to the voters the second time, the voters defeated it again. It then went to the town council for surgery, but they only tampered with it slightly and no sanctions were issued by the education association.

What is significant about this phase of the teacher-board relationship is the increased militancy of both teacher organizations. However, although the board did move in granting them further improvements on salary and fringe benefits, it was not exactly overwhelmed by their united protests and the threat of sanctions made against it with respect to not cutting the budget.

Perhaps the most significant development was the action of the field representative of the state association, with the support and encouragement of the local association, in threatening the township with "sanctions" if the town council cut the budget. It was the first time *any* teacher group publicly manifested a willingness to disrupt the school system. Although the association did not implement the threat, it showed that now it was ready to do something *against* the board, if its wishes did not prevail. This is clearly a recognition that its collective power could be wielded without fear of retaliation from the board.

Modes of Communication and Content

In this Time 2 period the leadership in both teacher organizations could be counted on to get their membership aroused over an encounter with the board. However, besides the time of such special events as board encounters, a steady stream of literature emanated from their offices throughout the year. They printed newsletters, flyers, newsflashes, letters, and information bulletins, all in the hope of keeping the membership generally informed and involved. The predominant themes found in this literature were: (1) their state of relative deprivation, (2) their anti-board line, (3) their organizational ethnocentrism, (4) their polemical and derogatory propaganda directed against the other teacher organization, (5) their plans for the future, and (6) pleas for support. Of course, the printed word was buttressed by an increase in the num-

ber of organization meetings which allowed for the in-person presentation of positions, plans, and projects.

Surveys and Organizational Support

Another way the teacher organizations used to mobilize group support, generate a sense of involvement and the feeling among the membership that their voice would be heard by the board through their representatives was to survey their opinions and suggestions on what the leadership should propose to the board in their annual negotiations. It provided even the lowliest, shiest member a vehicle by which he could make his needs felt.

Mottoes and Militancy

The Time 2 stage was a period of rising expectations for the teachers. It was a period where tangible gains through organizational effort could clearly be pointed to. It was a time when progress, professional negotiation, collective bargaining, and the successful precedents of teacher militancy in other cities were in the air.² It was a time when relative deprivation was high, patience short, and the potential for passion was increasing. During this period the association's motto of "action, not words" and the union's motto, "be sure you're right, then be willing to fight for that right," were resurrected and given wide currency. They typified, in sum, the jettisoning of the "reactive posture" and the new militant action-oriented offensive posture that both organizations were developing in their relations with the board.

Pressure, Perseverance, and Success

Some indications of how successful the teacher organizations were in making their wishes prevail might be gleaned from the following board decisions in their favor. In addition to a steady advance in salary, insurance, and other benefits, they obtained during this Time 2 period: (1) acceptance of the five-year-old proposal to divide their salary into 20 pay periods; (2) agreement to

the 12-year-old request concerning payment for extracurricular activities; (3) the granting of the long-sought proposal for paid sabbatical leave; (4) the recognition of their right to study the master insurance policy covering the teachers—something denied for many years; and (5) although the board had consultants screening candidates in and outside the school system for the principalship of the high school, the teachers, by petition, got the board to appoint the man of their choice. These gains were achieved primarily through the application of consistent and unrelenting pressure on the board.

Some Failures and Their Consequences

Despite these concessions granted by the board, the board was still clearly in a superordinate position. One of the things which it never conceded until the end of this period and then only in promise form was regularly scheduled meetings. The board's position was that "meetings would be held as the need arises," which really meant, as infrequently as possible. This had the consequence of keeping the teacher relations with the board somewhat chancy and unpredictable. The further consequence of not having such a regular vehicle by which they could be informed and could influence the board, as far as the teacher organizations were concerned, was aptly summarized by a note found in the minutes of a union meeting concerning the selection of summer school teachers. It said: "we do not know what is going on." This appeared to be exactly what the board wanted. It not only made it an elusive target but it helped to deprive the teachers of ammunition they could use against it.

The Budget Slash and the Offensive Attitude

The Time 2 period started out with a vigorous display of collective militancy on the part of the school employees. The following years found the teacher organizations, in particular, tooled up to make further incursions on the power of the board, a task at which they had some success. The final phase of the Time 2 period ended as it began, with another vigorous collective display of united teacher power.

In the late fall and early winter of 1965, both teacher organizations negotiated with the board and both organizations wanted much more than the board finally offered. In fact, after the board's final offer, the association requested the County Superintendent of Schools to put pressure on the board to reopen negotiations. This tactic did not prove to be very fruitful as the board's final offer remained final. Among other gains, the key concession on the part of the board was a \$400 across-the-board raise for every teacher. Although the teacher organizations, particularly the association, feigned unhappiness with the offer, they accepted it and again mobilized their members for their annual telephone and "get out the vote" campaign in support of the budget. As was becoming usual in Stonehedge, the budget was defeated twice by the electorate. By law the budget went to the mayor and town council who thereupon excised \$700,000 from it. Along with their action, the mayor recommended that the teachers' raise be reduced to \$200, the sabbatical leave program be dropped, that three new remedial reading teachers should not be hired, and 20 of 38 new teaching positions eliminated. The mayor felt that "they were just cutting the fat off the budget." Of course, the teachers in both teacher organizations were distressed, and despite their recent anti-other propaganda, their leaders joined together to form a joint action committee to coordinate their fight with the town council and the board. As the first order of business, they got all the teachers to march on city hall; this was the first public demonstration ever engaged in by the Stonehedge teachers. It did not, however, get the town council to reduce the slash.

Since it was up to the board of education and not the town council to decide *which* items in the school budget would be reduced or eliminated to the amount of \$700,000, the board found itself in a difficult position, but it announced that it planned to cut the teachers' raise by \$100. Both teacher organizations accused the board of negotiating in bad faith since it had already committed itself to a \$400 raise. The board felt it had no other alternative. The day after the board's announcement, the attorneys for the two teacher organizations obtained a "show cause order" against the board. It temporarily restrained the board from going ahead with the cut. But the board pleaded its case shortly thereafter and won.

In the meantime, the representatives of the union bargained with the board to see if it would come up with a better offer while the association appealed to the State Commissioner of Education. The association eventually withdrew the appeal as it did not look as if it would turn out in its favor. The teachers, however, had one more lever to apply: they got practically 100 percent of the teachers to withhold from the board their intent to return slips, contracts, or letters of resignation. This made it impossible for the superintendent to estimate how many new teachers would be needed and what positions would be vacant for the following school year. Since the controversy had by this time dragged out to May, this was a strong lever. It worked, for the board offered the teachers a \$500 increase spread over two years, \$300 for the 1966-1967 year and \$200 for the 1967-1968 year. Both teacher organizations eventually agreed to it.³

THIS particular episode, as compared to the United movement of 1961, generated much more vehemence and acrimony among the principal parties. Distrust, deception, bad faith, "politics," and the destruction of the Stonehedge school system were themes that the teacher organizations elaborated on in their struggle with the board and the town council. Both the teachers and the board recognized that the real villains of the piece were the mayor and town council, but the board was caught in the dilemma of how to make the cuts in the budget that would least damage the quality of education in Stonehedge. Its problem did not impress the teachers and the teachers mobilized a vigorous double-pronged campaign against both the town council and the board. Beside the precedent-setting forms of protest used in the United movement of 1961, they engaged in a number of important firsts. It was: (1) the first time a public demonstration against the town council or anyone, for that matter, ever occurred; (2) the first time any of the teacher organizations brought the board of education into court; (3) the first time that teacher organizations ever appealed to the Commissioner of Education; and (4) the first time the teachers ever used a retaliatory measure against the board that would have been disruptive to the school system if it perdured very long, i.e., withholding of "intent slips."

These new modes of protest all reflected the increasing confidence the leadership of the teacher organizations were gaining, as well as the fact that broad-based teacher support "for a cause" could be counted on.

Below is a summary of the patterns of teacher behavior manifested during this period.

The United movement (20); checkoff and stability (7); preparations, persistence, and payoff (5); action programs and influence (19); modes of communication and content;* surveys and organizational support (5); mottoes and militancy (7); pressure, perseverance, and success (10); some failures and their consequences (4); the budget slash and the offensive attitude (29).

* These patterns cut across events discussed in other categories looked at from a different viewpoint and are not independent. Consequently, the number of behavior events is not included.

REFERENCES

¹ Such an outcome would have been predictable according to Robert C. North, H. E. Koch, Jr., and D. A. Zinnes, "The Integrative Functions of Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (September, 1960), pp. 355-374; and Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956).

² See, for example, Commission on Educational Reconstruction, *Organizing the Teaching Profession* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955); James P. Stiffensen, *Teachers Negotiate with Their School Boards*, U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Bulletin 1964, No. 40 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1964).

³ The coalition of 1966 is another example of the way in-group conflicts can get patched up when an enemy from *outside* the educational system launches an attack. It is an age-old replication of the way group solidarity emerges when the members are faced with a common enemy.

TIME 2

THE POWER DIFFERENTIAL DECLINE: BOARD BEHAVIOR

What kinds of behavior does a school board engage in when it perceives that the teachers who formerly possessed individualized inferior power begin to collectivize that power and exercise it in their dealings with the board?

Ritual Testimony Revisited

Twice in Time 2 this pattern of board behavior (ritual testimony) occurred. A good instance of it happened at a public meeting of the board three days after the earlier United movement among the school employees was organized. At this meeting the finance committee of the board recommended acceptance of the proposed 1962-1963 budget prior to submission to the County Superintendent. It was adopted by the board. *Afterwards*, the representatives from the various employee groups presented arguments in favor of higher salaries for board employees. They had no voice in the preparation of the budget and the probability of their getting the board to change the budget was very low. The board, of course, listened, but was not moved.

Another interesting nuance to this episode further reflecting what appeared to be the board's relative disregard of its employees and the teachers in particular, occurred four weeks later during the public hearing on the budget. At this hearing many teachers pleaded for the board to expand the budget to provide increases in salary and hospitalization to be paid for by the board. The board did nothing. At the same hearing, however, there was a large number of people present who demanded that a special question be put on the ballot for building additional classrooms to reduce the number of double sessions. In response, the board adopted a resolution expanding schoolhouses which would cost up to \$900,000. This decision reflects who the board's significant others were—it appears that they were not the teachers. It also appears that although the teachers were protesting with an unprecedented vigor, they had not yet found the board's Achilles' heel. On the other hand, it apparently had not yet dawned on the board that the power of the teachers was any different from Time 1.

Besides ritual testimony, the following patterns of board behavior occurred in Time 2 as well as Time 1: diversionary involvement; ignoring the teachers; keeping relations unstructured; and procrastination, promises, and partial concession.

Diversiory Involvement

The curriculum revision task again took place in Time 2. This time it was put under the aegis of an assistant superintendent hired especially for this purpose. However, like the days of yore, the final report slipped into clerical limbo. As a protest against the *status quo* attitude of the board, the curriculum expert eventually resigned.

At other times during the Time 2 period, the teachers were asked to contribute their time and views to the school dropout problem and the trimester plan. No innovations eventuated from their suggestions.

Ignoring the Teachers

In early Time 2, the board appointed the Adult Evening School Advisory Council, consisting of two principals, two representatives

from the Parent-Teacher President's Council, two representatives from large companies, one representative from the Junior Chamber of Commerce, and one reporter. Not one teacher representative was appointed.

In late Time 2 the board's curriculum committee recommended four new courses. The chairman of the committee said that discussions were held with respect to the feasibility and nature of the courses with members of general service clubs, representatives of industry, state department officials, and school administrators who had operated similar courses. There is no evidence that the teachers had any role in this recommendation that was adopted unanimously by the board.

It appears that the general orientation of the board was to give the teachers as little information as possible whether it was on school expansion, budgets, or benefits. An example cited earlier was the refusal by the board to permit the teachers' union to study the master insurance policy covering the teachers. Until the teachers knew what was in the policy, the board knew they could not mount a serious attack on it, or suggest better alternative plans. For three years they successfully prevented the teachers from knowing.

Keeping Relations Unstructured

Both teacher organizations wanted a regularly scheduled plan whereby they could meet and talk with the board. Throughout Time 1 and Time 2, this desire never became a reality. Apparently the board figured that by limiting interaction with the teachers, it would limit their complaints, influence, and opportunity to exercise power. This tactic also prevented the leadership of the teacher organizations from acquiring the prestige attached to frequent meetings with the board and it appears that one thing the board did not want, among other things, was to raise the prestige of the leadership of the teachers' organizations.

Promises, Procrastination, and Partial Concession

The same patterns of temporizing, promises, and partial payoff of Time 1 occurred throughout Time 2. For example, the sabbatical leave program promised in 1964 was to go into effect in September

of 1965. Somehow the board forgot when it was to become official and only on the union's insistence was it finally adopted as policy in November of 1965. The extracurricular pay episode, a classic case of the waiting game, took 12 years to materialize, and then on a shoestring basis.

An interesting example of partial concession and biding for time was the board's response to the union's request that teachers be allowed to leave the building during the lunch period. The board granted this right on a one-month trial basis. After the trial period was studied, and if the experiment did not prove to be detrimental to the effective operation of the school, the board said it would become board policy. After the trial period, the situation reverted to the previous state of affairs.

Chronicle of a Resolution

A very interesting specimen of delay and do-nothingness that is somewhat extreme occurred in connection with a resolution the board adopted in 1954. It involved a proposal to change the names of all the schools in the township from numbers to names. Nothing, however, was done to implement the resolution and the primary reason was that the board member who introduced it was not elected to office after his term expired. Six years after this, a citizen requested that the board change the schools from numbers to names. This request was referred to the board's program and policy committee. No one seemed to remember that such a resolution had already been adopted by the board. Two months after this, a woman's club wrote the board making a similar request. Their letter was read and filed. In June 1963, three years later, a home and school association made the same request. Its letter was referred to the building and grounds committee. In August 1963, the same citizen who had made the request in 1960 reiterated his request. His letter was referred to the program and policy committee. In October 1964 the Citizens Redevelopment Committee made its request, which was read and filed. In March 1965, after requesting an answer from the board on its previous letter sent six months earlier, the Committee received a reply. There is no evidence in the board minutes that it affirmed or denied the request. Finally, after a

citizens' committee in May 1966 requested that the numbers of the school be changed to names, the board denied the request.

This brief episode illustrates a number of important patterns used by the board that have already been discussed, e.g., placation by resolution, clerical limbo, and time delay mechanisms. It also suggests another mode of handling unwanted suggestions, namely, dispatching them to the wrong committee.

A Crowded Agenda

In the latter part of Time 2 the teachers began to get quite vigorous in their dealings with the board. The board, however, was not cowed by what appeared to be a rise in teacher power, and it exemplified in its behavior that it was not. In 1965 the union was insisting that the board call a collective bargaining election between the union and the association for the purpose of determining which teacher organization would be the sole bargaining agent with the board. The board refused to call an election between the two and in March the union gave the board an ultimatum. The union representative told the board if it did not set an election date by Friday (of that week), the union had pledged to employ one or more of the following:

- 1) mass teacher absences; 2) a protest meeting on a school day; 3) closing one school per day; and 4) a general shutdown of schools.

This was only the second time that any teacher group had threatened the board with a disruption of the school system. The first time it had occurred, the board was not impressed and this time it appears the board was not either, since it still refused to set a date. The Friday of that week came and went and found the union membership still in their classrooms. The union did not give up though and continued to press the board to come to a determination. When the April meeting of the board came around, the union insisted on action. A spokesman for the board indicated, however, that a "crowded agenda" prevented it from taking any action on the representation election. This was a delay mechanism never before heard of in Stonehedge and one which did not exactly please the

union. Nevertheless, the union proved to be relentless in its desire for an election and the board unyielding in its opinion that it could not legally insist on one. Finally, the representative of the union insisted that if a date for an election was not forthcoming, then the board should declare the bargaining agent after determining from its records which teacher group had the majority of members. The board seized on this suggestion as a peaceful way out of the problem. It counted the membership cards of both groups, and with some fanfare certified the union as the majority teacher organization. The union counted it as a great win but the association indicated that the resolution was meaningless, since everybody already knew that the majority of teachers belonged to the union. The association was correct, for shortly after, the board hastened to add that the certification did not imply by any means that the union was the sole bargaining agent for the teachers, only that the board recognized that it enrolled the majority of Stonehedge teachers in its ranks. By this time, summer had swallowed up the controversy.

Attack on the Checkoff

During Time 2 the power of the teachers was exercised in each succeeding year with a little more vigor. Year after year, the leadership of the teacher organizations could point to substantial improvements in salary, working conditions, and fringe benefits. Above all, they could see that by the end of Time 2 the board was seriously beginning to countenance them. Beside these steady advances one thing that apparently distressed the board was the threat of both teacher organizations to disrupt the Stonehedge school system. On top of this was the unity of both teacher organizations during the budget slash episode and the unanimity with which the teachers acted in withholding their "intent to return slips."

The board began to discuss ways to control the teachers, and as early as February 1966 the question of eliminating the payroll deduction of professional dues was discussed. Nothing was done about it, however, until the summer of 1966, when the board put the onus on the association to demonstrate why this payroll deduction of professional dues should continue. The association responded with two legal opinions and its case was sustained.

The Case of Extracurricular Pay

As early as 1954 the union asked that the teachers be paid for moderating extracurricular activities. At this time the board's reply was that this request would be granted *soon*. Each subsequent year when it came time for the union to present its salary proposals, it always included the request to be paid for extracurricular activities. Somehow the board always put this request "under advisement," denied it outright, or pleaded a tight budget and suggested that it would be granted soon.

In September 1964 the union made a survey of teachers involved in extracurricular activities, found out how much time each moderator spent on them and recommended what it considered was just compensation. In October 1964 the report was presented to the board and the board stated that it would "negotiate" extracurricular pay with the union after January 1, 1965. Although the board said it could see no reason why this money could not be made available in the 1965-1966 budget, it was not. From January 1965 to June 1965 the union repeatedly requested that the board meet in order to negotiate activity pay. The union was, however, denied a meeting by the board contrary to the board's own statement of October 1964. In May 1965 the board authorized the superintendent to study the requests for extracurricular pay and make recommendations to the board. In the late summer of 1965 the superintendent's committee published its report of recommended compensation for extracurricular activities. In October 1965 the issue was still not settled and the union pressured the board until it agreed in December 1965 to make a definite statement of its position. On December 29, 1965, the board finally agreed to extracurricular pay, which was to become effective September 1966. It was at a rate of approximately one-fourth of what the union had asked.

Although the board did eventually capitulate to the union request for activity pay, it was not in a manner that indicated they were at all awed by the rising teacher power. In fact, it appears that they looked at it somewhat casually, in a manner not very different from Time 1. It also seems that the delay mechanisms which the board used in stretching this episode out over 12 years were similar to the ones they used in other instances in both Time 1 and Time 2, for the extracurricular pay case is a prime example of:

promises and no payoff, clerical limbo, partial concession, keeping relations unstructured, and the function of study committees as a delay and cooling-out mechanism. In addition, the rate of compensation for teacher moderators was somewhat reminiscent of the Time 1 board behavior, discussed in "equality—teachers and janitors."

The 1966-1967 school budget allocated almost \$35,000 overtime pay for janitorial personnel while the cost of the compensation to teachers directing extracurricular activities was \$8,675.

Below is a summary of the Time 2 patterns of board behavior:

Ritual testimony revisited (7); diversionary involvement (3); ignoring the teachers (5); keeping relations unstructured (8); promises, procrastination, and partial concession (4); chronicle of a resolution (11); dispatch to the wrong committee (3); a crowded agenda (11); peace through resolution (7); attack on the checkoff (3); the extracurricular pay episode (14).

TIME 2

THE POWER DIFFERENTIAL DECLINE: ASSOCIATION- UNION RELATIONSHIPS

The focus in this section will be on association-union relationships and the question which is addressed here is: in Time 2, when the party with inferior power is partitioned into at least two parts, what kinds of behavior do these parties engage in vis-à-vis one another?

Coalition 1961

In Time 1 the union and the association joined together five times in order to present a united front to the board over some goal they wanted. But none of these attempts at temporary unification appeared to influence the board very profoundly. In the beginning of Time 2, however, the United Employees of Stonehedge, of which the teachers were the dominant force, did exercise an unprecedented pressure on the board, and although it was not entirely successful in its demands, the United movement of 1961 did usher in an era of increasing militancy. But like all the other coalitions of Time 1, once the passion of the moment subsided, the coalition disintegrated, except that the teacher organizations parted at a higher level of respective solidarity. Shortly after, when the

checkoff was implemented, financial security under pinned the solidarity and facilitated a more rapid and efficient mobilization of the teachers' individualized inferior power. With this increase came an increase in the frequency and venom of the anti-other propaganda as well as a more lively participation in the one-upmanship game.

Interorganization Antipathy

During the periods, one at the beginning and the other at the end of Time 2, when the union and the association joined together against a common adversary, there was considerable cooperation. In the intervening years the antagonism between the two organizations was severe. The first published salvo came from the association in 1963 when it took great pains to denigrate the Occupational Liability Insurance that was offered as a valuable fringe benefit by the union. The association pointed out that it was a waste of money, since a law supported by the State Education Association passed long ago already covered teachers. The union countered with a defense based on the loopholes in the law and its general ineffectiveness.

In 1964, as a counter to the union line that celebrated its victories not only locally but nationwide, the association printed a letter from another local association indicating that "a report without foundation and entirely erroneous" appeared in the Stonehedge union's newsletter that said "a local of the AFT was formed in its district." This brief note again drove the association's point home that the union could not be trusted and that it dealt in lies to make itself look good. The union did not see fit to make an issue of its mistake. In November 1964, however, the union did see fit to unearth an old issue.

In an information bulletin it wrote:

Although Stonehedge probably has the most democratic teaching situation in the state, it is not entirely free of administrative harassment. It has been noted that at least one elementary principal is disregarding the by-laws of the Board of Education and is openly conscripting membership for the company union. [The association was the company union referred to.]

Three days after this was published, the membership of the union passed a resolution that stated that the Stonehedge Teachers' Union would not go into negotiations with the board for salary increases with the association. This resolution reflected the union's disdain for the association and showed that the cleavage between them was rather acute.

The association did not take the affront lying down, for from that point on a heavier barrage of criticism was cast at the union. In the association's November newsletter, for example, the editor took pains to criticize the union for only concentrating on welfare items in its negotiations with the board, while it lauded itself for focusing on salary, welfare, and a wide array of other educationally related items. The writers of the association's newsletters apparently were just beginning to sharpen their pencils for in the January-February 1965 edition of their newsletter, of 14 articles, five had an anti-union theme while in the March-April 1965 edition, four of ten articles were anti-union. This issue also included as the center fold a full page anti-union cartoon that suggested that unionism puts everyone in lock-step. One piece of anti-unionism that reflects the differing ideological and organizational allegiances of the two teacher groups and which, incidently, got resurrected by the association with great frequency, was printed in its January-February 1965 newsletter:

Are you a day laborer? One union (AFT) official would have you believe so; and more important. he would also have everyone else believe you're not a professional. Carl Megel, past-president of the AFT and currently legislative representative in Washington, D. C., said: "When a representative of the National Education Association equates professionalism they equate the matter of doctors and lawyers with teachers. This again is erroneous. A doctor and a lawyer is a business man. . . . A teacher is a worker. **YOU ARE A DAY LABORER.**" (Text of a public statement made in Cedar Falls, Iowa, May 14, 1962.)

We are **TEACHERS**. We are **PROFESSIONALS**. Let's leave unions for labor.

This piece of propaganda appealed to the upwardly mobile aspirations of the teachers who were loathe to identify themselves with the blue-collar working class.¹

On the other hand, the union had a piece of propaganda authored by Carl Megel that demonstrated the pressure tactics brought to bear on teachers to join the association throughout the country.² This article was a standard piece of anti-association material out of which the union in Stonehedge got a lot of mileage and which supported its age-old charges of administration domination of the association and its "company union" status. The association, of course, made its rebuttal available to the teachers by offering free copies of Marion Steer's article that was a biting critique of Megel's article.³

The One-upmanship Game

Quite analogous to the general interorganization antagonism expressed in both word and deed was the one-upmanship game. The object of this game was to demonstrate that one's own organization was better, more effective, more sensitive, and more *au courant* than the other teacher organization. It differed from other expressions of interorganization antipathy in that it was less offensive than their usually virulent anti-otherness. It emphasized the glorification of its own organizational activities and only indirectly put down the opposition. This pattern of behavior began in Time 1 after the inception of the union and perdured throughout Time 2.

For example, in the January-February 1965 association newsletter, an issue generally loaded with anti-unionisms, the association lauded itself for obtaining from the board "the most important gains this year, namely the increase from \$300 to \$500 for the Master's Degree and the addition of a sixth year to the guide." On the other hand, during this same period the union was congratulating itself for obtaining the new sabbatical leave policy. The union also indicated that the extra day of Christmas vacation that year was the result of a union proposal presented to the board. Not to be one-upped, the association reported that the board had agreed to meet with the teachers' association at regularly scheduled intervals throughout the year. Of course, the union could make no similar

claim and even though the association published this one, apparently it never materialized, for in June the association was still *trying* to get the board to meet with them at regularly scheduled intervals. Nevertheless, the promise provided the material for one-upping in February.

In May of 1966, the union announced its most recent achievement up to that time. It had gotten the board to shorten the days between the steps in the grievance procedure. This was regarded as a signal advance for both union and teacher. The association could make no claim to this coup, but it did advertise its role in developing the board's "professional relationships" policies.

One other instance of one-upmanship which the union never tired of proclaiming was its 12-year-old battle to get the board to pay teachers for extracurricular activities. It was finally granted in September of 1966 but only after the association got into the act with its set of recommendations. Although the credit for the long-term pressure and eventual victory went to the union, some of the glory was robbed by the association, for the board's final set of recommendations were vastly closer to the association's than to the union's. This outcome thus allowed both groups to claim a share of the victory.

In general, throughout Time 2 many other instances of these same patterns occurred over and over.

The Collective Bargaining Election Episode

Generally, during Time 2, the anti-union line of the association was of a more expressive, affective type than the union's anti-association line; quite frequently the union exhibited restraint in its willingness to enter into a mudslinging campaign. This does not mean the union was not anxious to do the association in, but rather that it mobilized a much more instrumentally-oriented offensive to bring it about. It culminated in the collective bargaining campaign which occupied a good part of everybody's time in the winter and spring of 1965.

The first official mention of a collective bargaining election was found in the February 17, 1965, minutes of the Stonehedge Teachers' Union. The record reads:

A motion was made and seconded that if the advice from the National representative be affirmative and if the above group agrees [Executive Committee] we should go for collective bargaining, the Board of Education would be approached the following Wednesday.

The advice was affirmative and the Executive Committee did agree that this was their big chance to eliminate the association, so the union petitioned the board to call for a collective bargaining election. The union leadership was confident they would win for two reasons: (1) they knew they already had the majority of Stonehedge teachers in their ranks, and (2) they had impressive precedents from many other cities where, with a secret ballot, the union scored resounding victories even though the actual membership of the union was small.

Naturally the association was not overjoyed about the prospect of being permanently eclipsed. A note from the editorial of their March-April 1965 newsletter reads:

A collective bargaining election, in union terminology, can mean only one thing; namely that the winner of such an election becomes the sole bargaining agent for all Stonehedge teachers. The losing organization loses its voice, its official status, and for all intents and purposes ceases to exist as a representative group.

The association also believed that if the union got elected, they would rapidly proceed to a "closed shop" as they did in Butte, Montana. Then union membership would be a condition of employment.

The board's position was that it could not force the teachers to have a collective bargaining election but if the two teacher organizations could agree on the terms for an election, it would abide by the results. Even when the union gave the board a letter and petition with 524 signatures requesting the board to set a date for a representation election, the board did not yield. Nor could the association and the union arrive at the terms for an election—a stalemate that was surely in the association's survival interest. The following quotes (from an association newsletter referring to a March meeting of the board, association, and union) indicate how tempers were

being frayed and how emotions were beginning to spill over in this struggle.

. . . Amid constant interruptions of falsehoods and generalizations during a presentation to Stonehedge's Board of Education, the S.E.A. [Stonehedge Education Association] was accused of using "Nazi" tactics in a reincarnation of "Hitlerism."

When an organization must name call in order to make a point, it stands to reason, perhaps, that they really have nothing constructive to say. This is the type of union leadership that is bidding for your support. Whether or not you want shouters and name callers who spout hollow promises, or people of action who will produce some results is up to you.

S.E.A. will continue to inform all the teachers of Stonehedge of all the truths. . . .

The leadership of the union was annoyed with both the board and the association, and as was described earlier in Time 2, board behavior, they threatened the board with drastic action if the board did not set an election date. The threat was of no avail and the board at its April meeting even refused to discuss the representation election because of "a crowded agenda." The union did not give up and kept pressuring the board. Finally, in June 1965, the board resolved the problem with great diplomacy. It certified the union as the majority teacher organization in Stonehedge, but not the sole bargaining representative of the teachers. Even though the union did not achieve what it wanted, the official verification of its majority status provided some consolation. In fact, the union even put it on its letterheads.

The association felt that it had won also, because the official board position was that employees in public employment have the right to organize and present and make known their grievances through representatives of their own choosing. The board also held that "after the evaluation of all factors it is the firm conviction of the board that we cannot recognize any organization or group as being the sole bargaining agent for any segment of employees." This resolution thus protected the association from extinction, and

prevented the union from being sole representative. It was regarded as a sweeping victory by the association.

Coalition 1966

The upshot of the collective bargaining episode was that the loyalties and ideologies of the two teacher groups were polarized to a degree Stonehedge had never seen. Nevertheless, in March 1966 after the town council chopped \$700,000 out of the 1966-1967 budget, their dispute ended with haste, a joint union-association action committee was formed, and unity and solidarity against the common enemy became the watchwords. Immediately a plan was devised, a division of labor decided upon, a call to the uncommitted teacher "to join the organization of his choice" sounded, and action followed. Association and union members marched arm-in-arm on city hall; association and union lawyers obtained an injunction against the board, and the association appealed to the commissioner of education while the union leadership bargained with the board over the proposed pay cuts. When the outlook seemed dimmest, both the association and union members in a persuasive show of strength agreed to withhold their "intent to return" slips. Shortly thereafter an agreement was reached.⁴

However, hardly had the flush of victory subsided when the one-upmanship game again emerged. In May 1966 Stonehedge's union newsletter said:

Six months give and take negotiating and several days of withholding contracts has resulted in an equitable two year salary agreement with the Board of Education. We wish to express our thanks to the teachers who supported our efforts and to the S.E.A. for its support of the union negotiating committee at the bargaining table. It has proven that a unified effort on the part of the two township teacher groups gets results.

The association, however, felt that its appeal to the commissioner was instrumental in getting the board to come to a reasonable settlement, and that although the union's negotiating role was important, its efforts were more salient. As Hegel suggested, every thesis carries the seeds of its antithesis. This short-lived thesis in Stone-

hedge and the subsequent display of one-upmanship raised the temporarily suspended level of acrimony to new heights.

To summarize, we have listed the variety of association-union behaviors in Time 2 below.

Coalition 1961 (7); interorganization antipathy (10); the one-upmanship game (15); the collective bargaining election episode (12); and coalition 1966 (8).

REFERENCES

¹ Robert Doherty, "Attitudes Toward Labor: When Blue-Collar Children Become Teachers," *The School Review*, LXXI, No. 1 (1963).

² Carl J. Megel, "Teacher Conscription-Basis of Professional Membership," *Teachers College Record*, LXVI (October, 1964).

³ Marion L. Steet, "Professional Associations—More Than Unions," *Teachers College Record*, LXVI (December, 1964).

⁴ This was a sequence of behavior having precedent in the great social movements of history. See Lewis M. Killian, "Social Movements," in *Handbook of Modern Sociology*, ed. by Robert Faris (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1964), pp. 426-455.

TIME 3

THE POWER DIFFERENTIAL ELIMINATION: UNION BEHAVIOR

Time 3 refers to the period when the teachers broke the traditional decision-making mold of the board and forced the board into bilateral decision making where the teachers' voice would play a key role in establishing salary levels and working conditions. It was a period also characterized by a willingness of the teachers to disrupt the school system if their important demands were not met. In Stonehedge this phase began to unravel in the fall and winter of 1966, and reached its end in both a massive disruption of the Stonehedge school system in January 1967 and in the capitulation of the school board to the teachers. These events signaled the entrance of a new era of bilateralism.

The general question of interest in Time 3 is: what kinds of behavior do the parties involved in a power relationship engage in vis-à-vis one another when the party that traditionally had inferior power acquires power equal to that of the party that traditionally had superior power? The focus in this chapter is not, however, on this general question but only on the question concerning the kinds of behavior engaged in by the teachers toward the school board in the situation where the power differential between them has been eliminated. In particular, the focus here will be on the union's be-

havior vis-à-vis the board since it was this organization in the beginning of Time 3 that demonstrated that the traditional power differential between them and the board was ended.

One final limitation concerning the treatment of Time 3 must be noted and it is that in gathering the data some reasonable cutoff point had to be established concerning the date beyond which no additional information would be systematically gathered. The cutoff date decided upon was July 1, 1967. Choosing this date meant that the treatment of the Time 3 period would be essentially confined to its beginnings. This, however, did not appear to be a major drawback since the behavioral patterns shifted so radically from Time 2 that it is very improbable, given the generally increasing degree of militancy through this period, that there would be any reversion on the part of the teachers to the reactive posture.

Preparation, Project MESS, and Organizational Support

In early September 1966 the union surveyed the teachers of Stonehedge on what they would like to see the teachers gain in their negotiations with the school board. The feeling on the part of the leadership of the union was that this relatively systematic investigation would allow them to know what the anticipated needs of the teachers were as well as their order of priority. The outgrowth of the survey was a 72-point, 30-page report entitled *Project MESS—More Effective Stonehedge Schools*.

It was the most comprehensive set of proposals that any teacher group ever planned to present to a Stonehedge school board as a basis for negotiations. It included proposals on everything from improved extracurricular pay, to better pregnancy benefits, to more comprehensive insurance, to the request for centralized attendance registers, to the demand for more remedial reading teachers, and on and on. A great deal of planning, coordination, and hard work was put into this project by the union leadership. But besides occupying their time for a few months, the project was also used as a recruiting mechanism to let potential members know what the union was going to do for them. In addition, it was used as evidence for those already members that the union was still in there first with the most. As a

consequence of this, and of some moment, was the fact that the leadership had a great deal of their ego and reputation tied up in the enterprise.

From Request to Demand: The Posture of the Strong

On October 18 the union sent Project MESS to the school board with a request to open negotiations for the following budget year. The board, however, did not acknowledge receipt of it. In a union flyer of November 10, 1966, was written: "The Board has had Project MESS in its hands for three weeks and has chosen to officially ignore the existence of such a program." In the same flyer the behavior of the administrative staff who also had copies of Project MESS was commented on:

Last week secondary school principals met, with the originators of Project MESS barred, with the Director of Secondary Education. They secretly hacked away at items that offended vested interests and scratched through MESS proposals item by item. A similar meeting is planned for elementary principals.

Prolonged intransigence by our school board and administrators can only deepen and widen the area of conflict.

As the last sentence suggests, the board's behavior as well as the administrators' behavior was not calculated to give the teachers the impression that their long planning, hard work, and high hopes were appreciated. In fact, their behavior was really inflammatory and was instrumental in bringing the union to the brink.

Consequently, the union president moved from a request position to the point where on November 21 he *demand*ed that negotiations begin. "Demand" is not a word found very often in the vocabulary of the weak, but is one often employed by the strong. The board, of course, apparently figured the union leader was dealing in hyperbole, but to assuage the union the board directed the staff of the superintendent to meet with the union's negotiating committee to discuss Project MESS. The meeting occurred November 23 and some areas of agreement were found, but the union

wanted to talk with the board and still insisted on meeting with it, not its subordinates.

Persistence and Publicity

On November 28 the union announced that its negotiating team would be on the front steps of the Administration Building at 7:00 p.m. "demanding the board meet with the teachers as required by law." At 7:45 p.m. a member of the negotiating team was to report to the general membership meeting whether the board had arrived to meet with the union. It is interesting to note in passing the three items on the agenda for this general membership meeting: (1) a report of the November 23 meeting with the superintendent and his staff, (2) a vote on the executive council recommendation to establish a strike fund, and (3) a vote on the executive council's recommendation to challenge S.E.A. to a collective bargaining election.

The board did not show up on November 28, but the newspapers did, and the next day the waiting teachers and their vigil were given good coverage. On the evening of the twenty-ninth the negotiating team again waited in vain but more newspaper reporters, spectators, and other interested parties were there and the next day the papers gave even better coverage to their plight. On that day the union finally got the board to agree to meet on the following Monday. When the agreement was reached, the union president was quoted as saying:

We remain displeased that it has taken so long to begin our deliberations and will, therefore, seek revision of the board's policy that made it necessary to publicly show our displeasure.

What was unique in the union's campaign up to this point was: (1) the intensive preparation for negotiations, (2) the elaborateness of their proposals, (3) the shift in their approach to the board from request to demand, (4) the public display of their frustrations, and (5) the sophisticated utilization of the press to bring pressure on the board.

Resolve, the Hard Line, and a Threat

The union met with the board five times in December and was adamant about its desire for serious consideration of its 72 proposals. At the end of the last meeting, however, the board rejected Project MESS and its 72 proposals as a basis for serious negotiation. During the Christmas vacation the union leadership reduced the 72 items to nine "primary objectives" and added a tenth, a salary guide for a bachelor's degree of \$6,000 to \$12,000. The other nine primary proposals were: improvement of the remedial reading program; hiring of teacher aides; creation of a permanent substitute pool; increased pay for regular teachers who substitute for absent teachers; a shorter school day; expansion of music, art, and physical education in elementary school; installation of centralized attendance registers; and the demand for 30-minute "professional periods; and expansion of extracurricular activities."

On January 9 and 10 the union negotiating team met with the board which was still firm in its refusal to budge on any of the items. On the ninth, however, the membership of the union adopted a resolution which was included in a letter of January 10 to the board. It said:

Whereas unless the priority proposals of Project MESS and a revised salary guide of \$6,000 to \$12,000 be met by the Board of Education, [let it]

Therefore, [be] resolved [that] the Executive Council of the S.T.U. [Stonehedge Teachers' Union] will recommend that immediate steps be taken to effect a work stoppage in Stonehedge Schools.

The board was somewhat annoyed at the threat, yet somewhat unbelieving that the teachers would ever go through with a work stoppage. Consequently, a resolution to obtain an injunction against the teachers was tabled. Instead the board demanded that the union retract its threats. In response, the president of the union read a letter at the board's emergency meeting on the twelfth. It said: "The executive council of S.T.U. has not made and will not make a recommendation to its membership with regard to a work stoppage."

What appeared to be a retraction from the board's viewpoint and what gave it the feeling it had backed the union down was really a gross misinterpretation. The union president's statement did not say that there would not be a work stoppage but that it would not be recommended by the executive council. The door was still open for the membership to vote a work stoppage without the council's recommendation.

A Demonstration of Power

The board was scheduled to introduce the budget on January 16 and its monetary offer to the teachers included a salary guide of \$5,600 to \$9,000 for a bachelor's degree. The board was confident that it would prevail, for rarely was a budget ever changed as a result of public hearings. It also *knew* the teachers would not do anything rash despite their obvious dissatisfaction and aggressive language. In the meantime, however, a national representative of the union, well known for his organizing ability, his participation in teacher strikes, and his generally inspiring leadership, arrived on the scene to assist the local union leadership in their contest with the board. Final plans were laid for the strike. Later on, other state and national AFT leaders would come on the scene to lend their support to the Stonehedge local.

A general membership meeting of the union was called for Sunday night, January 15. The Executive Council as promised did not recommend a work stoppage but the membership attending (about 250 teachers) voted on drastic action. They intended to strike, voted in favor of one, but did not call what they planned to do the next day a strike. The official position of the union was that the Sunday meeting would be adjourned until 7:00 a.m. the following morning in front of the township's high school. There the teachers could meet and decide on further action. This was merely a euphemistic way of saying that the union was going on strike. The theory behind the action was that the public employees clause of the state constitution allowed employees to assemble and discuss their grievances. The union tried to maintain the fiction during the first week of the strike that they were not on strike but were just "meeting" every day, but a strike by any other name was

still a strike. The next day about 540 classroom teachers of 894 failed to show up at work. The action stunned the superintendent of schools and the school board. That afternoon the attorney for the school board obtained an injunction answerable the following week forbidding 12 of the union leaders from continuing any strike activities. That night the teachers, about 400 strong, attended the board meeting and the union leadership spoke out strongly. At a recess the board attorney handed out copies of the injunction to the union leaders. The chairman of the union's negotiating committee said, "This is using a fear tactic to quell our right of free speech. It is obvious what we'll do in the morning."

The strike lasted for eleven days.¹

The Disruption of the School System and the Possibility of Abandoning It

The board's official position with respect to the striking teachers and negotiations was: "You have to go back to the classrooms before talks can begin."

On January 17, the second day of the strike, the union leaders met with the board and the board reiterated its position; the union again rejected the board's demand for a return to work. On January 18, both parties continued in their respective positions but the teachers were further angered by the school board, for their attorney obtained contempt citations from the Superior Court against the strike leaders. This sequence of events hardened the teachers on strike in their resolve to see this crisis through and the union leaders encouraged them unceasingly in their quest for "justice." In addition, anything that could be used as a fortifying source of motivation was communicated with celerity. On January 19, for example, union headquarters prepared some 500 copies of the injunction order to be distributed among the teachers. This document allowed each teacher on strike to have his own symbol of how he was traditionally victimized by the school board and the electorate in Stonehedge. Moreover, every incident of bad treatment, abuse, and frustration at the hands of administrators and the board was remembered, catalogued, and spread about.

Up to this point and throughout the remaining period of the strike, the educational process in Stonehedge was profoundly disrupted. Over one-half of the teachers remained on strike; less than a half of the 21,000 students showed up for school, and the superintendent could only keep the schools open on a half-day basis. In addition, the striking teachers were beginning to bandy about the idea of forsaking the system, *en masse*. On January 20, for example, the teachers prepared a list of districts where temporary teaching positions were available, and on January 23, when it was clear no progress was being made, about 150 of the striking teachers boarded buses for New York City in order to apply for jobs there. No one actually intended to leave the system but as far as the board was concerned the threat was a real possibility.

During the middle of the first week of the strike, the board was beginning to see the striking teachers were serious and determined. They also recognized that they needed help, so they retained a consultant. He finally persuaded the board to drop its previous "return to work, then negotiations" stand and invite the union for talks on January 21. The Saturday session lasted four hours and the Sunday session until 6:30 a.m. Monday. At that time the union leaders brought the board's "last offer" to their membership, who rejected it. At this point in the stalemate, local community leaders began to offer their services as mediators. The union accepted the offer, but the board rejected it. The board's feeling was that it was up to "the law" now.

The Wedge of Power and the Bilateral Agreement

On Tuesday, January 24, the teachers began the first of three days in court. The upshot of the affair was that the 11 unionists were convicted of contempt but sentencing was postponed. During the court proceedings no negotiations between the union and the board transpired but a secret meeting was arranged by a local politico between two union leaders and two board members. This meeting laid the groundwork for a nationally known mediator to come in. On Wednesday night, January 25, the board announced that he would arrive Saturday. In the meantime, telegrams of support were pouring into union headquarters from all over the coun-

try. Support came in even more tangible forms too, for the New York City United Federation of Teachers offered the striking teachers interest-free loans to substitute for the semi-monthly salaries they were losing.

When Saturday arrived, everybody was hungering for a settlement so the mediator's job was not too difficult. Nevertheless, he displayed marvelous skill and tact in handling the disputants, and by 2:45 a.m. on Monday he got all three sides to accept his recommendations. The striking teachers, of course, felt that they had won a great victory. The average pay boost for the following year was \$1,350 and all of the nine "priority proposals" were resolved almost to their satisfaction. In addition, the board agreed that no reprisals would be visited upon the striking teachers and that the school board attorney would ask for leniency for the convicted teachers, a promise which the teachers later felt he reneged on. Furthermore, the agreement would be reduced to writing and signed by both parties. Finally, in order to solve a problem before it became a crisis, the board agreed to have regular monthly meetings among themselves, the administration, and the teacher representatives.

The Aftermath

The striking leaders were sentenced heavily. The union and the whole labor movement were outraged and to them the teachers became a symbol of unjust treatment by the courts, a reminder of the archaic public employment laws that forbade them to strike and, of course, a source of inspiration for every struggling teacher in the nation. On the local level in Stonehedge the making of these martyrs generated an unprecedented solidarity among the members. It also demonstrated to the teachers the length to which the union leadership would go on their behalf.

Although the agreement was reached on January 27, the final written document that spelled out the terms of the settlement was not signed until June 6, 126 days after the strike. There had been some dispute between them over certain items like the attorney's obligation to ask the court for leniency and the union's demand that the last step of the grievance procedure would be arbitration; the

board wanted the presentation of an issue to the board to be the last step and arbitration next to last. The mediator who settled the strike subsequently ruled in favor of the teachers on both counts. Finally, however, the signing of the memorandum of agreement took place on June 6 at which time the union president said: "The memorandum of agreement was a vehicle that will enable the teacher to have an effective voice in the determination of his personal and professional welfare."

Even before the signing of the memorandum, the union was meeting on the second Monday of each month with the board and the administration representatives. This regular channel of communication finally put them in on the ground floor of decisions that would affect them and the Stonehedge school system.

The union did not spend too much time in a victory dance for by May 19 the "Son of Project MESS" was on the boards.

The Time 3 behavior of the union is summarized below:

Preparation, Project MESS, and organization support (10); from request to demand—the posture of the strong (10); persistence and publicity (6); resolve, the hard line, and a threat (10); a demonstration of power (11); disruption of the school system and the possibility of abandoning it (13); the wedge of power and the bilateral agreement (8); the aftermath (10).

REFERENCES

¹ There have been other sociological treatments of strikes, e.g., Alvin Gouldner, *Wildcat Strike* (New York: Harper and Row, 1954); Bernard Karsh, *Diary of a Strike* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1958); and more recently, Robin F. Badgley and Samuel Wolfe, *Doctors Strike: Medical Care and Conflict in Saskatchewan* (New York: Atherton Press, 1967). None of these, however, have explored the historical antecedents to a strike in the manner presented here. Nor have they utilized a longitudinal conceptual scheme to organize their findings. Nevertheless, they did provide helpful methodological models, especially in the way they organized and treated diverse sources of data; Karsh, in particular, was of much use.

TIME 3

THE POWER DIFFERENTIAL ELIMINATION: ASSOCIATION BEHAVIOR

In the beginning of Time 3 the union was the more vigorous organization of the two teacher organizations in pressuring the board and pursuing its case. The association did not, however, just lie down and die, for it had a constituency of over 400 members who were anxious for improvement in their lot. In this section, therefore, the focus will be on the association's behavior in the situation where the power differential between the board and the teachers has been eliminated.

Petition for Reopening Negotiations and Patience

While the union was getting Project MESS together, the association decided to petition the board to reopen salary negotiations. In its letter of October 10 to each board member the association explained that its purpose was "to correct the inequities that exist within our present salary guides." Included in another letter that it also sent to the board were 32 working condition proposals that it wished to discuss with the board. The association waited eagerly for a response from the board throughout the rest of October and up to November 20. But as of that date not only did the board not

even indicate when it would meet with the association but it did not even see fit to acknowledge receipt of the proposals or the letters.

Using an Intermediary

Finally, the association on November 20 sent a letter to the superintendent in which it told about the board's deaf ears and its increasing frustration.¹ On November 22 it sent the superintendent another letter, again submitting copies of its proposals and suggestions for a new salary guide for 1967-1968, asking the superintendent to forward them to the board. On November 28 the superintendent told the association that the proposals were in the hands of the board and that it should call his office for a conference "so that we both have a thorough understanding of the proposals." The conference between the association leadership and the superintendent and his staff was convened on November 30. Nothing tangible eventuated from the meeting.

Arousing the Membership: The Rational and Circuitous Route

While this waiting game was going on, the association began to drum up membership support. In its November 10 newsflash the following reasoning for opening salary negotiations was offered:

One of the main reasons the Stonehedge Education Association asked to reopen salary negotiations was that A-9, a bill sponsored by the State Education Association, was likely to pass the legislature before the end of the calendar year. If it did and Stonehedge salaries were allowed to stand, Stonehedge would be in the position of paying the state minimum on all steps except the first two.

The conclusion drawn from this was that the Stonehedge district would have difficulty in recruiting and there would be a high turnover of teaching personnel. The members were then urged to write to their representatives asking them to support the bill. This sort of call to arms was not likely to raise the adrenalin level in anybody and, of course, it did not. It is also interesting to note the altruistic bent of the association's argument for more money—the

district would be disadvantaged in recruiting and suffer high teacher turnover. Hardly a word was mentioned about the need of the individual teacher to maintain a decent standard of living. The union with more of a bread-and-butter orientation focused on its membership's need to survive in a moneyed economy in their pursuit of better salaries.

The Union and One-downmanship

A slight measure of which organization was making a more formidable presentation of its case can be gleaned from the dates on which each group met with the superintendent and his staff and afterwards the school board. In both cases the association met after the union did. In the first case the association met with the superintendent and his staff seven days after the union. In the second case the union through its public display of dissatisfaction with the board got the board to meet with them on December 5. The board granted the association a meeting the day after. This is somewhat symbolic of the way the association appeared to be following the lead of the union.

Progress and the Hard Line

During the December negotiations while the union propaganda was darkened with pessimism, the association felt tremendous progress was being made and that a settlement was in sight. However, on January 10, an association flyer indicated the board was still being unreceptive to its salary proposals. It also indicated that its negotiating team was still "hammering away at staffing problems" and the difficulty the board would have in recruiting 200 teachers, its estimate of the following year's needs. Nevertheless, the board stuck to its official position:

In view of the two years agreement with the teachers for the school year 1966-67 and 1967-68, and because of the abnormal increase in the total school budget due to the opening of the new senior high school (in September), no change can be made in the teacher's salary guide next year. The board is aware of the unfavorable position in which we will be placed in recruiting new teachers but feels that consideration must be given to the district's ability to pay.

On January 16 the union struck the schools. On the same day the association sent telegrams to each board member "urging them to join with the association in requesting the State Commissioner of Education to send a fact finding team to Stonehedge to make necessary recommendations with an aim toward resolving our current impasses." In addition, the association laid out its tactics to its membership to get the board to speed up negotiations. They suggested: (1) implementation of the State Department of Education's study team offer, (2) a public relations program to tell residents what the school system needed, and (3) issuance of a threat of mass resignations in June. These plans proved to be a trio as ineffective as anything the association had ever done. On January 17, for example, the board agreed to ask the State Commissioner *not* to come to Stonehedge but *if* he were asked to come to Stonehedge, would he come. This was a response in keeping with the board's usual style of handling the teachers. As far as the public relations program and its potential effect on pressuring the board went, the association apparently forgot that in the previous year it had expended a great deal of effort on this very type of program, all for nought. The tactic of threatening resignations in June, like all their prior threats and like many deferred penalties, was an example of the soft lever of pressure, a type of pressure that seemed not at all appropriate to the circumstances. Nevertheless, while the union was out "hitting the pavement," the association in a January 18 flyer said: "The Association would follow a reasoned, constructive and well-timed action within the framework of the law to bring about improvements."

On January 19 the association again met with the board in a negotiating session and established two prior conditions for any and all future negotiations: (1) the salary policy would be adopted before the budget was adopted, and (2) the board and the association would sign an individual memorandum of agreement.

The first condition was important because as a consequence of a State Education Association law which had only passed in February 1966, if the board established a salary guide for the teachers before the budget was adopted and if the budget was defeated twice at the polls and the town council insisted on cuts, the one item which they could not cut was the teachers' salaries. The

second condition, apart from the obvious utility of having the terms of any agreement in writing, was important for two reasons. One was that the association wanted specific credit for its efforts, and the other was that it knew the union was going to insist on a written memorandum of agreement for itself and the association did not want to suffer the embarrassment of not having a similar document. As for both of the conditions, though, neither one of them cost the board very much to grant.

Eclipse, Stolen Thunder, and the Dramatic Gesture

On January 20, a Friday, the association and the board met again and the president of the association felt that a settlement could be reached by Monday. By Saturday, however, the board had finally agreed to negotiate with the union and both Saturday and Sunday were taken up by negotiations with them.

The association in the meantime was sitting on the sidelines worried that it might be finessed out of the picture. Consequently, on January 23, the association formally requested resumption of negotiations.

On the morning of the twenty-third, the union membership rejected what the board termed its "last offer." On the next day the association again met with the board and the board presented it with a package. The association was clearly in a dilemma, for the board's offer was reasonable and under ordinary circumstances it would have been regarded as a monumental advance, but if the association accepted what the union had rejected, it would have been accused of acting out the compliant "company union" stereotype. It was also possible that if it accepted the board's offer and the union subsequently came up with a better package from the board, which package would have been applicable to *all* the teachers, its organizational demise would have followed swiftly. The association could not, therefore, possibly accept the board's offer, and did not.

One other factor of great moment would also have influenced its rejection of the board's offer, if the association had known about it, and may very well have, and that was the agreement reached in the early hours of the morning of the twenty-fifth between repre-

sentatives of the board and the union to agree to call in a nationally known mediator to settle the strike. If the association had settled with the board on the twenty-fourth, then, all the publicity, glory, and prestige attached to being in on negotiations with such a renowned public figure would have been lost. The union would have consumed it all. Whether the association was privy to the decision made at this "secret" meeting is not known. Even if it were not, it still had sufficient reason to do something dramatic. Consequently, on Wednesday afternoon, the membership rejected the board's offer and issued 11 "sanctions" against the Stonehedge school system. Among these was the blacklisting of Stonehedge for employment in the state's teachers colleges and threatened mass resignations. In effect, the sanctions declared Stonehedge "an unfit place to teach." Such sanctions, if they continued, could cripple a school district for years.² This bellicose action by the association was unprecedented and represented a final transition to a hard line backed up by strong deeds, a posture it was not used to, but one thought necessary under the circumstances.

That night the board announced that the nationally known mediator would arrive on the scene the following Saturday. That same night the association announced that as a condition for settlement it would have to be included in the mediation efforts. The consultant to the board got the board to assent to the condition and this decision outraged the union which felt that the mediator's lime-light should only be shared by its members since they were the ones who were instrumental in causing him to come. The association, on the other hand, was overjoyed when the board agreed to include it in the mediation.

Third Parties, Fleeing the System, and Propaganda

While all this was going on, experts were flying in from all over the country to help both the union and the association in their strategy and tactics. In addition, the leadership of the association sent a letter to the mayor, the budget slasher of 1966, requesting a meeting with him to discuss several ways he could be helpful in lifting the sanctions. It seems the association was willing to use any help to come to a settlement, even from one whom they publicly

loathed and privately maligned. Apparently, though, he was not much help for he was only interested in holding the line on school costs. As it turned out, all he kept reiterating to everybody was: "We can't afford to be a pacesetter."

The association, like the union, had to demonstrate to the board that it was willing to leave the Stonehedge system if an agreeable settlement could not be reached. Consequently it published in a January 27 report the following telegram received from the NEA:

The National Education Association and the State Education Association will make the services of ACCESS, the NEA, Nation Wide Teachers Placement Service free to the teachers of Stonehedge. The NEA Regional Director will be in Stonehedge with application forms upon request of the Stonehedge teachers.

In the same flyer it published a telegram sent to the nationally known mediator:

The Stonehedge Township Education Association will be pleased to accept your services as mediator in the current dispute between the Education Association and the Stonehedge Board of Education.

These telegrams were for purely propaganda purposes, especially the one to the mediator. They apparently served to give the membership the illusion that they were driving a harder bargain and holding a bigger club than was the case.

"Hammering Out a Settlement": The Militant Vocabulary

When the mediator arrived on the scene, there was no doubt that he was in charge. In the space of 19 hours he came up with recommendations that were acceptable to everybody. During the negotiations the association kept the membership informed and afterwards on January 30 in an information bulletin to the membership the following communication was published:

The Association's Negotiating Committee met with members of the Board and the mediator in an attempt to hammer out a salary and working conditions package that would be acceptable to members of the association.

No one begrudged the association a little indulgence in hyperbole or even the use of their favorite metaphor but, as a matter of fact, the mediator gave most of his attention to the union demands. As expected, the association ratified the mediator's recommendations.

The Aftermath

At the end of January the association membership had its annual rally 'round the budget. Telephones, literature, and buttonholing were again aimed at the Stonehedge electorate. The association even asked each member to pledge a day's pay to educate the electorate to the need for quality education. All was again in vain for at the polls the budget failed twice. However, when the budget went to the town council, it only made a token cut.

In April, with some fanfare, the representatives of the association and the school board signed a memorandum of agreement, almost two months before the union did. This document was tangible evidence of the power differential elimination between the association and the school board, for even though the association was softer than the union in its pursuit of its goals, nevertheless, the board was genuinely worried about the impact the "sanctions" might have on Stonehedge's future. Consequently, when the document was signed and the sanctions lifted the board members were relieved and acknowledged that the association's sanctions, like the union's strike, had them in a corner. Shortly thereafter, scheduled monthly meetings ensued between the association, administration, and the school board which as in the union's case gave the association a regular vehicle by which it could make its influence felt.

Below is a summary of the association's Time 3 patterns of behavior:

Petition for reopening negotiations and patience (6); arousing the membership—the rational and circuitous route (2); the union and one-downmanship (4); progress and the hard line (7); eclipse, stolen thunder, and the dramatic gesture (8); third parties, fleeing the system, and propaganda (5); "hammering out a settlement": the militant vocabulary (3); the aftermath (11).

REFERENCES

¹ Working through the Superintendent of Schools was one of the NEA's recommended practices. See, for example, T. M. Stinnett, "Professional Negotiation, Collective Bargaining, Sanctions and Strikes," *Bulletin of the National Association of Secondary School Principals*, XLVII (April, 1964), pp. 93-105.

² Commission on Professional Rights and Responsibilities of the National Education Association, *Guidelines for Professional Sanctions* (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, November, 1963).

TIME 3

THE POWER DIFFERENTIAL ELIMINATION: BOARD BEHAVIOR

So far in the Time 3 period the behavior of the union and the association toward the board has been reported and discussed. The specific question addressed here is: what kinds of behavior does the board engage in vis-à-vis the teachers in the situation where the power differential between them has been eliminated.

Silence as a Position of Strength

There are many ways a party with a great deal of power can exercise it. It can coerce, bludgeon, browbeat, pressure, or even petition subordinates to execute its wishes. It can even, in certain kinds of circumstances, do nothing, say nothing, and ignore the requests of its subordinates, a type of power exercise that speaks as loudly as the more overt forms. This was the tack the board chose in its dealings with both teacher groups at the outset of Time 3. The board members apparently felt that the power differential between them and the teachers had not substantially changed from prior times, so the old modes of dealing with the teachers were still thought to be adequate for the situation. Consequently, the board members, who were busying themselves promoting passage of a

bond issue for school construction figured the needs of the teachers were of a lower priority and did not even bother to acknowledge the requests of either the union or the association. Their preoccupation with the school bond issue was somewhat indicative of the board's and the Stonehedge electorate's enthusiasm about building new schools but strange reluctance to improve the lot of the personnel running them.

Delaying Tactics, With the Budget in the Wings

As indicated earlier, the union was relentless in demanding a meeting with the board but finally when the board did acknowledge the existence of Project MESS it directed the union to meet not with it but with the superintendent and his staff. The union did so on November 23, but still insisted on negotiations with the board. After the union publicly displayed the back-of-the-hand treatment it was receiving from the board through its nightly vigils on the steps of the Administration Building on November 28 and 29, the board finally agreed to meet with it on December 5. These delay tactics on the part of the board were clearly reminiscent of their traditional way of letting "the budget deadlines and the plea of time" eliminate the influence of the teachers.

Inflexibility and the Motion of Negotiation

The board took a very hard line with both teacher groups during the December negotiations. Some concessions, of course, were made but these were the kind that did not cost the board much money and were not the most important as far as the teachers were concerned. At the end of the December meetings the board members rejected Project MESS as a basis for any further negotiations, and towards the association they were adamant about refusing to increase the salary level of the teachers one penny.

The union came back on January 9 and 10 with ten key items for discussion while the association pursued its case on January 10. The board was still firm in its adherence to a hard line and did not substantially move from its December position. The board maintained that in the spring of 1966 as the upshot of the budget slash

episode the teachers had agreed to a two-year package with a \$200 increase for every teacher slated for the 1967-1968 budget year. This, it explained, was all that had been allocated in the budget and all the teachers would get. In addition, the board held that the teachers' demands for new increments violated the agreement they had made the previous spring.

The Bad Judgment of the Strong

The history of revolutions bears out an important factor in the demise of ruling cliques and that is, the party that traditionally had superior power typically overestimates its real power and underestimates the power of its subordinates. Stonehedge seems to be no different, for throughout the early negotiations the board never veered substantially from its hard line. The board members had made plans to introduce the budget on January 16 and, as in the past, felt that no substantial changes would eventuate from the public hearings. They also were confident that as militant as the teachers sounded, especially the union, once the budget was adopted, the teachers would accept it. Consequently, when the union told the board that its Executive Council would recommend a work stoppage if the board did not come to an agreeable solution, the board did not obtain a court injunction enjoining the union from such action, which it could have, but merely told the union to retract the threat which the union obligingly did. The board did not, however, take into account that the union membership could strike without the recommendation of their Executive Council, which they did.

A Strike and the Legal Remedy

When the union struck, the board was stunned. Its immediate response was to obtain an injunction against the strike which was served on the evening of the first day of the strike. This was the first time that the board ever had to have recourse to a third party in order to handle the teachers. The board was fully confident that the injunction would force the teachers to return to work. However, it had miscalculated the extent of the union's desperation. In addition, the board members overlooked the effect of their own and

their attorney's generally callous treatment of the union leaders. For example, at one point in the public meeting on January 16 with over 400 people in attendance, one board member called the president of the union "a liar." Although he subsequently apologized, the apology was forgotten in the passions of the next 11 days while the insult stuck and became a symbol of the way the teachers felt they were maltreated by the board. It, of course, helped on top of all the other stories of board abuse to harden the teachers' resolve in their illegal course of action. When Wednesday, January 18, came the board attorney obtained contempt of court citations against the striking leaders with the hearing scheduled for the following Tuesday.

Legal and Other Kinds of Definitions of the Situation

In the meantime, the board was inflexible in its demand that the teachers return to work before negotiations would begin. The union categorically opposed the board's position and demanded negotiations, a settlement, then a return to work. The board viewed the strike as illegal, a violation of the state constitution that forbade public employees to strike, and refused to negotiate with the teachers while they were engaging in criminal behavior.

Another interpretation of the union's strike by the board was that it was just a show of power. The teachers, of course, did want to demonstrate their power to the board but they had ten tangible demands they wanted met before they resumed teaching and felt that their one power lever would be lost and the probability of bringing off a satisfactory agreement minimal, if they reopened the schools first, then negotiated.

Another interpretation of the strike that was shared by members of the board and one which the superintendent of schools never tired of repeating to the press was that the union strike was "no more than a power play for increased membership in the union."

In addition to these interpretations of the union's action, members of the board, the association, and segments of the Stonehedge community could not resist deprecating the "immorality" of a teacher strike where the innocent victims were the children who

were being deprived of an education. Some union leaders felt, however, that since the children got about six holidays a year to celebrate over national heroes, received an Easter vacation and a Christmas vacation, got off from school when it rained too hard or snowed too much, were let out for two days from school while their teachers attended a state association convention, and were even excused from school when the athletic teams won state championships, then a few days off as a consequence of their teachers' fight for social justice hardly put a catastrophic dent in their educational experience.

Use of the Press and Swaying Public Opinion

The commotion that surrounded the strike was such that it made good copy. The union had perhaps the most expertise in capturing favorable headlines, but the board and the superintendent of schools did not lose a chance to tell their story to reporters. All were conscious of the molding effect their statements would have on public opinion in mobilizing support for themselves and pressuring the adversary, so their statements were generally made with some care. What is of particular interest, though, is that at no other time had the board ever so indulgently and frequently utilized the press to drive home its points. It might have been a reflection of the power differential elimination between it and the teachers, and its need to tip the balance of power in any way it could.

Playing One Teacher Group Against the Other

During the first week of the strike while the union and the board were at loggerheads, the board continued to negotiate with the association. The president of the association continued to maintain that a settlement was in sight and the board offered them an excellent package which they hoped the association would accept. If the board could have settled with the association, it would have seriously hurt the union's ability to hold out, for the public pressure would have been intense with the board's offer "justified" by the association's acceptance. The board members, however, did not

fully comprehend the association's dilemma and were somewhat distressed when the association not only rejected their offer but retaliated by issuing sanctions.¹ The board was then caught in a two-pronged pincers movement and ready to seek relief.

Use of Experts

Near the end of the first week of the strike when it became apparent that the unionists were not about to be cowed into submission, the board decided to call in a consultant who was an expert on teacher-board relations. He convinced the board of the futility of inflexibility and persuaded it to offer to negotiate with the union without making a return to work a condition. On the following Saturday and Sunday the board did and in the early hours of Monday morning the board members presented the teachers with what they termed their "last offer." The union rejected it.

At this point various community leaders offered to mediate the dispute and the union accepted but the board refused. The board members presumably felt that whereas they could hire a consultant to aid them, they could not give up their autonomous decision-making power to a mediator whose decisions, although "advisory," would, as a matter of fact, have been somewhat coercive. They were not yet ready to bargain away their power for the sake of a settlement. The feeling was that the courts would substantially help to resolve the impasse. The courts, however, moved slowly, the schools were still closed, and community pressure was mounting. Consequently, the board was becoming receptive for any face-saving device that would resolve the impasse. The one that was finally hit upon was to call in a nationally known mediator. He arrived on Saturday, January 28, and after 19 hours of negotiations, he came up with a list of recommendations. All three sides in the dispute wanted everyone to know that the recommendations were *his* and not their own and that although they did not contain everything they had supported, nevertheless, in the interest of ending the turmoil they would agree to them. Everyone, consequently, came out enhanced by the settlement.

The Aftermath

The agreement substantially gave the teachers what they had bargained for. Beside significant boosts in salary and improvement of working conditions, they set important precedents in obtaining a share in certain educational decisions that were up to that time considered the private preserve of the board, e.g., hiring remedial reading teachers and special area teachers, obtaining centralized attendance registers, rescheduling the school day and reducing the number of marking periods, establishing a permanent substitute teacher pool, duty-free lunch periods, and limitations on class size. In addition, the board agreed to put everything in writing and to protect the integrity of the agreement to the fullest extent. Furthermore, the board agreed that no reprisals would be visited on the striking teachers; in fact, it might have seemed that they were rewarded disproportionately when, for example, three new positions of subject coordinator were created and three members of the union were appointed to these jobs. At the same time, however, the union felt the board's behavior was mixed with a combination of revenge and renege: revenge, when the board refused to pay the striking leaders of the union for the two days off when they were summoned to court for sentencing and probation examination after the strike; and renege, on two accounts, when the board attorney did not publicly plead for leniency for the teachers and when the board initially refused to agree to arbitration as the last step in the grievance procedure. However, apart from these instances, as mentioned earlier, the union and the board finally agreed to scheduled monthly meetings wherein the board offered to open itself to the ideas, suggestions, problems, and solutions offered by the teachers. The era of bilateralism had arrived and was signaled by the board's signing of the "memorandum of agreements" with the association first and one and a half months later, with the union.

Below is a summary of the Time 3 board behavior:

Silence as a position of strength (2); delaying tactics with the budget in the wings (6); inflexibility and the motion of negotiation (5); the bad judgment of the strong (4); a strike and the legal remedy (5); legal and other kinds of definitions of the situation (5); use of the press and swaying public opinion (2); playing one teacher group against the other (3); use of experts (1); the aftermath (8).

REFERENCES

¹ On the national level the traditionally conservative NEA is becoming as militant as the union, e.g., the February 1968 statewide *strike* in Florida sponsored by the State Association and supported financially and ideologically by the National Association.

TIME 3

THE POWER DIFFERENTIAL ELIMINATION: ASSOCIATION- UNION RELATIONSHIPS

What kinds of behavior do the association and the union engage in toward one another as both are pitted in a struggle against the board of education?

One-upmanship

As in Time 1 and Time 2, the art of demonstrating one's organization's prowess was also exercised in Time 3. At the beginning of the school year in September 1966, for example, the association advertised in one of its newsflashes four accomplishments, plus two grievances that it had *already* resolved for its membership. On September 25, however, in the old spirit of interorganization antipathy, the union president in its own newsletter castigated the association for "the moral irresponsibility of the S.E.A. flyer in terms of *not* informing accurately." He went on to write:

The union would not be dragged into the verbal gutter or use energies in a nonsensical or negative dialogue with the association . . . the union approach has always been positive and constructive.

These words appear to be a way of doing what he said he would not do. Nevertheless, the association was undaunted, for on September 29 in one of its "action bulletins" it proceeded to herald another problem solved by its alert and aggressive leadership. The teachers were being required to collect insurance money from the children and keep records of those who paid or did not pay. The teachers felt that since the premiums were going to a private agent who, incidentally, was a former board member, that it was his job to solicit and collect the money. The association brought the problem to the superintendent and he agreed with the teachers and pledged to do something about it. Of course, the union was not to be done in by this horn blowing, so on October 12 it listed five grievances its team resolved in an encounter with the superintendent. One of them had to do with student insurance which the superintendent pledged to do something about.

Another case in this early pre-strike period involved the dates on which each group presented the petition for reopening negotiations as well as their negotiation proposals. The association's presentation was on October 10 while the union's presentation was on October 15. Much ad hoc self-congratulation and invidious comparison inevitably followed even such a minor case of one-upmanship as this, for anything that could possibly be regarded as a "coup" which put down the other organization was relished and published.

Another case along this line began on November 21. At the public board meeting the president of the union vigorously presented its case for reopening negotiations. The association president was also there but said nothing. The next day a reporter published the account of the meeting and midway through the story said: "Present, but making no comment, was the President of the S.E.A." Not wanting to miss a chance at putting down the association, the union reproduced part of the account of the meeting, gave prominence to the quotation above and distributed copies to the teachers. The message was clear; the union was the driving force among the teachers while the association was too timorous to even open its mouth.

Broadening the Power Base

For about two years the teachers' union had been the spokesman for the school clerks and secretaries. With over 30 schools in the system and about three or four clerks and secretaries in each school, their number enlarged the potential power of the union considerably. The association, on the other hand, had long courted the nurses and were their spokesman, but unfortunately for them, there was generally only one nurse in each school. Consequently, in early Time 3, the association was considering ways to broaden its power base. It finally hit upon the idea of organizing the substitute teachers, a group that had been virtually ignored by both teacher organizations. Their campaign started in early October but proved to be a dismal flop. The campaign appeared to be a misdirected attempt to create needs where they were not felt.

Invitation to a Zero Sum Game: A Collective Bargaining Election

While the union was pressuring the board into a meeting, the membership again adopted a resolution "to challenge the association to a collective bargaining election for the purpose of determining a sole bargaining agent for the Stonehedge teachers."¹ In a letter of November 29 to the association president, the head of the union wrote: "It is requested that your answer to our request be in the affirmative so that we may both extend to our teachers the opportunity to exercise their constitutional right of a free democratic choice." What the union leader overlooked was that the members of the respective organizations had already exercised their constitutional right of free choice in freely joining either the association or the union or in not joining any teacher organization at all. Since he knew that the union would win such a collective bargaining election hands down, what he really was trying to do was to obtain the association's approval of a plan that would effectively phase the association out of existence.

Biding Time as a Negative Response

Instead of flatly refusing to participate in any election that would mean its death knell, the association president with some diplomacy,

quite reminiscent of the board's style of dealing with the teachers, referred the request to the "Officers Council" for study and said, "The recommendations of this council will be presented to the Association's Executive Board at our regular monthly meeting. You will be informed of the final disposition of this matter . . . later this month." When that meeting came about on December 20, the invitation was discussed at length. However, the president of the association wrote the union president: "In order to give every board member an opportunity to informally discuss the challenge, a motion was made to put off a final decision until the January executive meeting."

Support and the Crisis-to-be

While all this was going on, throughout December the ever-present membership drive, the unending one-upmanship game, and the unerring arrows of interorganization antipathy increased. This makes the following letter of January 10 from the union to the association all the more remarkable.

At a special meeting on January 9, 1967, the executive council of the Stonehedge Teacher's Union directed me to invite and encourage the support of you and your membership in the crisis which will soon be upon us.

Surely you must realize that our success will benefit *all* the teachers of Stonehedge. We cannot afford to let differences divide us when we share a mutual responsibility to achieve a common goal—namely, the welfare of the students and teachers of Stonehedge.²

Anti-Federation Themes: Strike Period

As one might have suspected, the association was not receptive to these overtures. In fact, when the union finally struck on January 16, the president of the association made some fairly hostile comments. A sprinkling of some of the things that he was quoted as saying in the press reflects the acute cleavage between the two groups. On January 16 he said:

The association was never asked to cooperate in the union's dealings and then we wake up one morning to a strike we didn't have one say about. . . . Let's not see the association on the end of somebody's kite.

Later, in speaking about the association's official refusal to support the union strike, he said, "We are not going to be stampeded into putting our fine organization behind an organization that didn't even know what it was doing." Three days later, on January 19, he was quoted as saying, "This illegal 'wildcat strike' is doing nothing but hurting the teachers' cause in Stonehedge. It is nothing but a power grab for membership by the A.F.T." What he really meant was that it was hurting the association, especially if it turned out to be a success. Even though the outlook for its success was uncertain by January 20, a sufficient number of association members had already torn up their membership cards to join the union—a turn-about that proved worrisome for the association leadership and increased the pressure on them to harden their stand with the board.

One dim hope the association may have had in relation to its refusal to support the strike was the possibility that the strike might fail. In that event the party that would have benefited most would have been the association which was pursuing its negotiations patiently, perseveringly, and within the law, a model of "professionalism." This might help to explain why the association did all in its power to help break the strike, e.g., reporting to work every day and denigrating the union position at every opportunity. It might also help to explain why the board was not exceptionally awed by the association's hard line. In addition, another point of pressure on the union was that the association's negotiating team continued to negotiate with the board while the board refused to negotiate with the union until the teachers returned to work.

Power Play and the Sweetheart Episode

What particularly irked the union leadership was the possibility that the association might make a deal with the board that it could not beat. Consequently, on January 20, when the association was meeting in the board room with the board to see if an agreement could be reached, outside under the window 12 union teachers in

the grand old tradition of labor sang, "Let Me Call You Sweetheart." It is interesting to note that while the board, the superintendent of schools, and the association shared the belief that the union strike was "a power grab for membership," in this instance the union's national representative described "the move by the board to meet with the association . . . as a 'power play' by the board to weaken the union stand." It appears that to describe the activities of one's opponents in power terms is tantamount to pinning a scandalous profanation on them.

Mediation and the Proliferation of Teacher Organizations

As the strike continued, it became apparent that the strikers were willing to risk a criminal conviction and jail in order to see their crusade end successfully. It also became apparent to the association leadership that if they wished to save their organization's face, they had to do something dramatically militant. Consequently, they rejected the board's offer on January 25 and issued "sanctions." In addition, they made another condition for settlement and that was that they had to be included in the mediation efforts which the board agreed to enter into with the union. The association was ecstatic when the board agreed to the condition, while the union threatened to withdraw from the mediation efforts if the association was included. The union had a kind of proprietary feeling about the nationally known mediator and did not want the association to intrude its presence and steal some of that prestige and publicity.

Anti-Union, Anti-Association Themes: A New Level of Acrimony

Once the mediator arrived, a settlement followed swiftly, but the antagonism between the two teacher organizations continued. On February 22, for example, the association took pains to indicate that not only did the board attorney not plead publicly in court for leniency for the convicted teachers but neither did the mediator write to the courts recommending leniency as he had promised. The

association wished to emphasize that the union did not and could not do anything about either one of these omissions for another strike was out of the question and the union had no other "hammer" to make its wishes prevail. The association indicated that it did, of course, and that was the "sanctions" that were still applied against the township.

Five days later the association issued another newsflash which said:

The association leadership believes the strike was nothing more than an attempt to destroy the Stonehedge Education Association . . . the only thing secure in the agreements are salaries due to the State Education Association's [bill] S-248 and that the only hammer to prevent the town council from slashing the budget is their sanctions.

The union replied in two ways: (1) On February 27 the head of the union again called for a collective bargaining election with the association. This would have shut the association up permanently. And (2) on March 2, in a "Stonehedge Teachers' Union in Action" bulletin, was this report:

The Association attempt to demean and falsify union gains is a common tactic to provoke the union into spending its time and energy in rebuttal. The S.T.U. has recognized the tactic and refuses to be diverted. The union will continue to direct its attention toward benefits for the total educational community.

On April 7, 1967, the union again challenged the association to a collective bargaining election. As of June 1968 the two organizations were still at loggerheads.

In the fall of 1968 the state legislature passed a bill providing for collective bargaining elections among public employees. In December 1968 after such an election in Stonehedge the union became the sole bargaining representative for the teachers. Since that time the union's relationships with the board have been characterized by great harmony and mutual respect.

Below is a summary of the patterns of relationship manifested in the Time 3 period between the association and the union.

One-upmanship (5); interorganization antipathy (2); broadening the power base (4); invitation to a zero sum game: a collective bargaining election (5); biding time as a negative response (3); support and the crisis-to-be (2); anti-union themes: strike period (10); power play and the sweetheart episode (4); mediation and the proliferation of teacher organizations (6); anti-union, anti-association themes—a new level of acrimony (6).

REFERENCES

¹ This conflict on the local level was a microcosm of what was occurring on the national level in terms of the bitter struggle for membership between the N.E.A. and the A.F.T. See, for example, Ronald Corwin, "Militant Professionalism, Initiative and Compliance in Public Education," *Sociology of Education*, XXXVIII, No. 4 (1965), 310-330; and "New Targets for Teachers' Unions," *U. S. News and World Report*, LX (June 31, 1966), p. 80.

² Again we have an example of the integrative effect conflict could possibly have among parties involved in an in-group conflict when faced with a threat that would have grave consequences for both. In this instance, however, the cleavages could not be cemented over.

SUMMARY AND PROSPECTS

At the outset of this research three questions were raised: 1) what kinds of behavior did the teachers and school board engage in when the power of the teachers was minimal with respect to the board; 2) what kinds of behavior did the teachers and school board engage in when the teachers were increasing their power vis-à-vis the school board; and 3) what kinds of behavior did the teachers and school board engage in when the teachers obtained a relative equality in power with respect to the board? In the previous chapters the answers to these questions have been presented in detail. In order to provide an efficient summary of these events in one place, the findings have been organized below into a propositional inventory. It specifies the behavior of each of the three principal parties in Stonehedge in each of the three time periods.

Time 1, The Traditional Power Differential—Board Behavior

1. In general, the school board was reluctant to relinquish the advantage of superior power.
2. The school board issued directives with complete confidence that they would be followed by the teachers.
3. The school board responded to salient pressures from many sources other than the pressures coming from the teachers.

4. The school board took steps to maintain its power over the teachers. In particular, it:
 - (a.) Attempted to maintain the fiction that the teachers influenced its decisions.
 - (b.) Engaged in a variety of delay mechanisms in order to deflate pressures brought against it.
 - (c.) Limited the frequency of interaction with the teachers.
 - (d.) Granted the teachers a variety of non-costly rewards.
 - (e.) In general, its style of keeping the teachers down was subtle; the blunt negative approach was rare.

Time 1, The Traditional Power Differential—Teacher Behavior

1. The teachers complied with the directives of the school board without challenging them.
2. The teachers feared to disobey the directives of the board.
3. The teachers were very reluctant to suggest or do anything that might upset the *status quo* of the power relationship.
4. The teachers afforded the board great deference in their dealings with it.
5. If the teachers wanted to protest something, they would generally use a mild form of protest, especially a letter.
6. The teachers tried to give the impression they had a significant role in the school system's education decision making.
7. The teachers regarded as wins all kinds of verbal board movement, even those that were of indefinite futurity.
8. The teachers engaged in many irrelevant behaviors as far as their power relationship with the board went.

Time 2, The Power Differential Decline—Teacher Behavior

1. The teachers cast the school board in an adversary-oppressor role.
2. The teachers catalogued the number, variety, and intensity of instances of victimization.
3. The teachers promoted the feeling of outraged injustice among members.

4. The teachers promulgated an ideology calling for a new order that would lead to justice and progress.
5. The teachers referred to the ideology that undergirds the traditional power structure as unjust, outmoded, and regressive.
6. The teachers endeavored to mobilize the support of other individuals and groups external to the immediate conflict in order to encourage them to apply added pressure against their superiors.
7. The teachers endeavored to expand their level of influence with the board.
8. The teachers raised their level of reward expectation.
9. The teachers engaged in bold forms of protest.

Time 2, The Power Differential Decline—Board Behavior

1. The board engaged in a variety of behaviors that were calculated to maintain the *status quo*. In particular, the board:
 - (a.) Attempted to maintain the fiction that the teachers influenced their decisions.
 - (b.) Engaged in a variety of delay mechanisms in order to deflate pressures brought against them.
 - (c.) Limited the frequency of interaction with the teachers.
 - (d.) Granted the teachers a variety of non-costly rewards.
 - (e.) In general, their style of keeping the teachers down was subtle; the blunt negative approach was rare.
2. The board sought to weaken the teacher organizations.
3. The board rewarded traditional conformers among their subordinates.
4. The board appealed to an ideology that supported the *status quo*.
5. The board referred to the ideology that undergirded the attempts to reduce the power differential as subversive of all that was right, just, traditional, legal, and hallowed.

Time 2, The Power Differential Decline—Association-Union Relationships

1. The association and the union expended much of their energy in an intramural fight.
2. Each group offered rationalizations to prospective members for joining their group and not the other.
3. The association and union presented a disunited front in the struggle against the school board.
4. Lacking a solidified power base, the teachers did not vigorously pressure the school board to accede to their requests.
5. Under the circumstances above, the teachers lowered their reward expectations.

Time 2, The Power Differential Decline—Board Behavior vis-à-vis Association-Union Where the In-group Teacher Conflict Was Not Resolved

1. The school board encouraged the internecine warfare among the teachers as long as it was to its advantage.
2. The board supported the group that it expected would be a lesser threat to its power advantage.
3. The board was able to dictate the terms of an agreement since it still had the power advantage.

Time 3, The Power Differential Elimination—Union Behavior

1. The union strived to legitimize its power position.
2. The union attempted to exercise its power against the board in order to prove to the latter that it was a group to be reckoned with. The union disrupted the school system to achieve its ends.
3. The union initially endeavored to obtain concessions related to immediate survival needs.
4. The union then proceeded to obtain “higher needs.”
5. The union was difficult to move toward the acceptance of a compromise.

6. After the disruption of the school system the union attempted to establish an atmosphere of cooperation with the school board.

Time 3, The Power Differential Elimination—Association Behavior

The same propositions that describe the union's behavior are also applicable to the association's behavior. There is, therefore, no necessity to repeat them here.

Time 3, The Power Differential Elimination—Board Behavior Where the In-group Teacher Conflict was Not Resolved.

1. The board initially failed to see the power differential elimination and related to the teachers in their Time 2 style of behavior, i.e., propositions, Time 2, board behavior, 1, 1 (a), 1 (b), 1 (c), 1 (d), 1 (e), 4, and 5.
2. The board gradually recognized the elimination of its power differential.
3. The board accepted the teachers as relatively equal.
4. The board conceded to the essential demands of the teachers.
5. The board was more reluctant to concede to the "higher needs" of the other teachers.
6. When the board found it was no longer in its interest to play one teacher group off against another when the collective power of either group was strong enough to disrupt the school system, then the board supported the unity of the two conflicting teacher groups.
7. The board endeavored to mobilize other individuals and groups external to the immediate conflict in order to encourage them to apply added pressure against the teachers.

Time 3, The Power Differential Elimination—Association-Union Relationships

1. The organization in the majority (the union) demanded exclusive recognition.

2. The minority group (the association) demanded that the minority voice be heard and would not support a democratic election.
3. Each teacher organization tried to demonstrate to the members of the other group that it had effective power to deal with the school board.
4. Each teacher organization continued its membership drive based on the advantages of its group and the disadvantages of the other group.
5. Each teacher organization strived to introduce pressure from third parties to support its position.

Some Implications of Research

By a careful study of the experience of Stonehedge it is probable that teachers, administrators, and school boards in other school systems could obtain some insight into their own teacher-school board relationships. Using one case study with its own idiosyncrasies cannot, of course, thoroughly do justice to the myriad of differences present in other systems but there are so many important commonalities shared by every school system that clear and close analogies to the Stonehedge experience are consequently not rare.

From the point of view of school board members Stonehedge provides a concrete enactment of the differing orientations of the union as compared to the association. It throws light on the varieties of stratagems and tactics which each group used in its quest for more decision-making power. It shows the kinds of issues that arouse, alienate, and activate the teachers and exemplifies the kinds of board behavior that is frustrating or satisfying to teachers. In sum, Stonehedge can suggest the kinds of behavior school boards would be well advised to avoid or to follow in their relationships with teachers.

From the point of view of teachers a number of findings were extremely relevant. First, the Stonehedge situation suggests the futility of the association-union rivalry on the local level. Ample evidence has been shown of the inordinate waste of time and energy spent by both groups on their infighting. This is energy, time, and

talent that could have been more fruitfully directed at the school board. Secondly, teachers can see the kinds of activities that did pay off for the Stonehedge teachers in their relationships with the school board. On the other hand, the kinds of behavior that were fruitless and even destructive to their status as well as to their relationship to the school board are apparent.

What the future holds for teacher-school board relationships in Stonehedge is not entirely clear. Since 1968 when the union became the sole bargaining agent for the teachers, its relations with the board have been very harmonious. But the day when the local taxpayer can no longer afford to pay for a growing, innovating school system is close. Another strike, a flight of teachers from the system, a dive to mediocrity or worse, are all possible. If, however, there is more adequate federal and state funding and perhaps a movement of teacher-school board bargaining to the state level, Stonehedge and other local school systems might move to an era of educational peace and excellence.

SOURCES OF DATA

The types of data that gave a relatively full and accurate report of the Stonehedge situation and which also included many divergent and partisan views were:

1. Official records, minutes of meetings, and other written documentation from the principal parties involved in the power struggle from 1944 to 1967. Those involved were:
 - (a.) The School Board.
 - (b.) The Stonehedge Teachers' Union.
 - (c.) Stonehedge Education Association.
2. Publications of the parent groups of the three principal parties involved:
 - (a.) *School Board Journal* (The State Federation of District School Boards).
 - (b.) *The American Teacher* (American Federation of Teachers).
 - (c.) *S.E.A. Journal* (The State Education Association).
3. Records of other interested parties surrounding the process were utilized insofar as they shed light on the power relations of teachers and the school board. These include letters in newspapers, speeches, published resolutions, ads in newspapers, and official statements of:
 - (a.) The State Department of Education.
 - (b.) Parental, religious, fraternal, political, business, student, and administration groups.

4. All the newspaper clippings from five newspapers that gave good coverage during the strike period and all teacher-school board articles that appeared in the official newspaper of the board from 1944 to 1968.
5. Official court records of the State Superior Court concerning the trial of the teacher-unionists who were cited for violating an injunction against the strike. In this case over 30 witnesses gave sworn testimony concerning their behavior and the effect the strike had on the schools and the community.
6. In addition, over ten representative informants, old and young, male and female, from each of the principal parties supplied and corroborated information. In particular, the long and frequent conversations with both union and association officials proved invaluable.

This wealth of data revealed the developing power struggle as it was in fact, and as it was seen by the various interest groups involved. No piece of information was considered irrelevant and no sample of behavioral patterns was attempted since the object was immersion, exploration, and microscopic examination of behavior events. Having such a diversity of overlapping information from different sources also helped to enhance the reliability of the data.

Appendix B

METHOD OF HANDLING AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

The data were collected, dated, and sorted within the framework of a 25-fold who-to-whom matrix.

The data unit that was the focus of the analysis was the interactional behavior event that occurred between at least two parties at one point in time. These data were buttressed by intra-group information on both the structural characteristics of each group as well as their internal operation. In addition, relevant contextual data were also collected. Over 5,000 separate pieces of information were so collected. The matrix of relationships used was:

TABLE 1
Behavior of One Party vis-a-vis Another

	Board	Association	Federation	Individual teacher	Others
Board					
Association					
Federation					
Individual teacher					
Others					

Of course, not every cell in the matrix was used and some cells only had a few events. In addition, in order to bring the study down to manageable proportions, *others* were eliminated. This left 790 behavior events involving only the teachers and the school board (Table 2). These events were then examined to see if cut-off points could be ascertained with respect to the establishment of radical changes in the power levels of the principal parties. Three relatively discrete periods were located and the data were sorted accordingly. (These periods have been referred to as Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3.) This, in effect, multiplied the 16-fold matrix (others eliminated) by three, generating 48 possible relationships. Through the method of content analysis the information in each category was then examined for patterns of behavior allowing the empirical data to generate the categories of behavior. Finally, in order to offer a relatively parsimonious presentation of the findings, the 16 cells in each time period were collapsed to three in Time 1, three in Time 2, and four in Time 3.

TABLE 2
Number of Behavior Events Collected and Analyzed for the
Principal Parties from Each Time Period

	Time 1	Time 2	Time 3	Total
Board to teachers	109	56	59	224
Teachers to board	186	144	109*	439
Association to union	11	27	25	63
Union to association	25	20	19	64
Total	331	247	212	790

* Of these 109 events, 69 involved the union and 40 the association.

